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Toward a Revised 4.2 No-Contact Rule 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.∗ 
Dana Remus Irwin∗∗ 
Introduction 
In our adversarial system of legal representation, ethical rules of 
attorney conduct focus on protecting the client. Accordingly, the two 
mainstays of legal ethics are the duties, owed to clients, of loyalty and 
confidentiality. The duty of loyalty requires lawyers to adopt clients’ 
interests as their own; the duty of confidentiality requires lawyers to keep 
matters relating to a representation confidential. A lawyer and client can 
then act together as a close working group, generally governed by 
principles of agency law. 
However, a lawyer’s duties to clients are constrained by obligations 
to others—to other persons, to the courts, and to the system of law and 
justice at large. Thus, for example, a lawyer may not engage in or assist in 
fraud committed on others; owes duties of candor to the courts; and must 
comply generally with the law of the land.1 Another set of obligations, 
stated in general terms, requires a lawyer to deal fairly with others while 
acting on behalf of a client.  
Our focus here is on Rule 4.2, the “no-contact” provision: 
  In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or court 
order.2 
Rule 4.2 is only one of several provisions directly protective of third 
persons. In the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2 is situated in a cluster that includes Rules 
4.1 through 4.4. Rule 4.1 provides that a lawyer “shall not 
 
 ∗ Thomas E. Miller Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California Hastings, College 
of the Law; Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center. 
 1. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2, 3.3, 8.4 (2008). 
 2. Id. R. 4.2; see also Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(1) (1969); ABA 
Canons of Prof’l Ethics No. 9 (1908). 
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knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person; or . . . fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary 
to avoid assisting in a criminal or fraudulent act by a client . . . .”3 Rule 
4.3 provides that:  
  In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented 
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is 
disinterested. . . . The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an 
unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the 
lawyer knows . . . the interests of such a person are . . . in conflict with 
the interests of the client.4 
Rule 4.4 provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not use 
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or 
burden a third person.”5 
Other rules have similar effect in constraining and qualifying 
lawyers’ duties on behalf of their clients. Rule 3.3(a)(1) prohibits a 
lawyer from making a “false statement of fact or law to a tribunal”;6 Rule 
3.3(a)(3) prohibits a lawyer from offering “evidence that the lawyer 
knows to be false”;7 Rule 3.3(d) requires that in an ex parte proceeding, a 
lawyer “inform the tribunal of all material facts . . . whether or not the 
facts are adverse.”8 Rule 3.4, meanwhile, includes a panoply of 
obligations to “opposing party and counsel,” which incorporate various 
rules of civil and criminal procedure that are themselves protective of 
opposing parties.9 
In short, the idea voiced long ago by Lord Brougham that a lawyer 
“knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client,”10 is 
simply not true and never has been. A lawyer representing a client must 
“know” many others. But under the no-contact provision of Rule 4.2, a 
lawyer is strictly circumscribed in whether and how to “know” a certain 
class of others—those who turn out to be clients of another lawyer. 
Our thesis is that as now written, Rule 4.2 is overbroad and 
ambiguous in important respects. There is a strong argument that the 
Rule should be repealed and its work done by Rule 4.3—that is, a lawyer 
should not present himself to a nonclient as disinterested, should not give 
legal advice (except to consult another lawyer), and should not negotiate 
with a person he knows to be represented.11 In the law of professional 
 
 3. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 (2008). 
 4. Id. R. 4.3. 
 5. Id. R. 4.4. 
 6. Id. R. 3.3(a)(1). 
 7. Id. R. 3.3(a)(3). 
 8. Id. R. 3.3(d). 
 9. See id. R. 3.4. 
 10. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 580 (1986); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 377, 378 (2004). 
 11. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.3. 
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ethics, however, once a rule protective of the profession has been 
adopted, repeal is unlikely. In the absence of repeal, we propose reform 
along the lines described herein. 
I.  Rule 4.2 as It Is 
Model Rule 4.2’s version of the no-contact rule, set forth above, is 
currently in force in substantially similar form in all U.S. jurisdictions.12 
Its roots can be found in Canon 9 of the 1908 ABA Canons of 
Professional Ethics, which advised that “[a] lawyer should not in any way 
communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented 
by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise 
the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel.”13 Canon 9 
was effectively a rule of evidence, however, and its no-contact concept 
was much more limited than that of today’s provision. Case law 
addressing the canon generally focused on whether concessions or 
admissions obtained directly from a represented person should be denied 
legal effect.14 
After the promulgation of the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility in 1970, this early formulation of the rule was expanded 
into the current prophylaxis of “no contact.”15 DR 7-104(A)(1), which 
was carried forward in substantially similar form in Model Rule 4.2, 
provided that a lawyer should not “communicate . . . on the subject of the 
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in 
that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing 
such other party or is authorized by law to do so.”16 Initially, ethics 
committees and courts treated DR 7-104(A)(1) with a more or less 
uncritical deference. They viewed the no-contact rule as providing 
necessary protection to lay persons who often lack the knowledge, 
training, and skills to protect their own interests, particularly when 
dealing with a lawyer representing an adversary.17 Some such protection 
against lawyer overreaching is no doubt desirable, but courts and 
litigants interpreted the rule to go farther, and to require that all 
 
 12. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b (2000). 
 13. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 9 (1908). 
 14. See, e.g., Coughlan v. United States, 391 F.2d 371, 376–78 (9th Cir. 1968) (Hamley, J., 
dissenting); Reinke v. United States, 405 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 
628, 633 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Ferguson, 243 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D.D.C. 1965); Juskowitz v. 
Hahn, 56 Misc. 2d 647, 648 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968); State v. Nicholson, 463 P.2d 633, 636–37 (Wash. 
1969). But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 108 (1934) (referring to 
Canon 9’s broad prohibition). 
 15. Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(1) (1969). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Comm. on 
Prof’l Ethics of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Inquiry Ref. No. 80-46, at 7 (1980) 
[hereinafter N.Y.C. Bar Inquiry Ref. No. 80-46]; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b. 
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information and communications with a represented person be routed 
through the lawyer.18 DR 7-104(A)(1) came to be “strictly construe[d]”19 
as a broad and strict prohibition against any communications—written or 
oral, direct or indirect—with any represented person in any legal context. 
Its successor provision, Model Rule 4.2, adopted this broad and strict 
approach. 
The primary advantage of this approach is the predictable standard 
of conduct it purports to provide through an absolute prohibition on 
contact. It also eases problems of proof by making the critical evidential 
issue whether there was contact with a represented person, rather than 
what was said or done in the course of the contact. This approach has 
shortcomings as well, however. It fails to accommodate countervailing 
interests, and it offers little flexibility to address situations where the 
rule’s application has undesirable or adverse results. For example, it 
subjects a lawyer to risk of disqualification for exercising her authority 
and fulfilling her duty to investigate facts by interrogating witnesses. 
These problems are exacerbated by the procedural context in which 
the rule is typically invoked. Rarely is it raised in the disciplinary context, 
where, strictly speaking, ethical rules have their only sovereign effect. 
Instead, it is typically raised in a motion in litigation.20 Use of the rules of 
attorney conduct as standards in contexts outside of discipline is both 
acceptable and proper, but different contexts give rise to different 
sanctions.21 In the disciplinary context, the sanction for an infraction of 
the no-contact rule would likely be a reprimand.22 In a litigation context, 
in contrast, the sanction typically sought is disqualification of opposing 
counsel, and courts typically feel obliged to award it, whether or not real 
injury has resulted.23 In fact, it is rare that a motion complains of actual 
injury to the protected client—for example, the elicitation of harmful 
admissions—and rare also that the remedy sought is suppression of the 
harmful admission, rather than expulsion of counsel. 
Even if the text of Model Rule 4.2 is not changed, courts should be 
mindful that the proper remedy is a matter of judicial discretion,24 and 
 
 18. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991). 
 19. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 517 (1962). 
 20. See, e.g., Faison v. Thornton, 863 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Nev. 1993); MMR/Wallace Power & 
Indus. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712, 714 (D. Conn. 1991); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1084–87 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Shoney’s, Inc. v. Lewis, 875 S.W.2d 514, 514–16 
(Ky. 1994). 
 21. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 6 (2000). 
 22. We know of no specific disciplinary case, which indicates that unless the accused lawyer had 
obviously exploited a naïve individual, the worst sanction that would be imposed would be a 
reprimand. 
 23. See cases cited supra note 20; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers § 99 cmt. b. 
 24. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 6 cmts. c, i. 
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that in the absence of actual or apparent injury, an admonition or 
referral to a disciplinary authority could be the appropriate response. As 
Comment i to section 6 of the Restatement (Third) states, “tribunals 
should be vigilant to prevent [the motion for disqualification] as a tactic 
by which one party may impose unwarranted delay, costs, and other 
burdens on another.”25 
Addressing Rule 4.2’s sanctions, however, will not address the root 
of the Rule’s problems—its overbroad and inflexible prohibition on 
communications. These problems invite new attention to the Rule’s text, 
comments, and application. Accordingly, the next Part reviews, 
evaluates, and proposes change to current conceptions of Rule 4.2’s 
function within the legal system. 
II.  Rule 4.2’s Purpose 
As commonly explained, the no-contact rule has two primary 
functions: (i) protecting the client-lawyer relationship from interference 
by opposing counsel and (ii) shielding the client from improper 
approaches by opposing counsel.26 These functions overlap to a 
substantial degree, but are conceptually, and often functionally, distinct. 
Courts and commentators recite both functions, but generally focus on 
the latter.27 A third function—protection of the lawyer’s interest in the 
client-lawyer relationship—is less frequently discussed. 
The 2002 amendments to Model Rule 4.2 included a new Comment 
1, which articulates the Rule’s purpose as follows: 
  This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system 
by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in 
a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are 
participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the 
client-lawyer relationship and the uncounseled disclosure of 
information relating to the representation.28 
The Restatement (Third)’s explanation of the no-contact rule is 
substantially similar: 
[States’ no-contact rules] protect against overreaching and deception of 
nonclients. The rule of this Section also protects the relationship 
between the represented nonclient and that person’s lawyer and 
 
 25. Id. § 6 cmt. i. 
 26. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); ABA 
Comm. of Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934). 
 27. See, e.g., Wright ex rel. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 567 (Wash. 1984) 
(explaining that in recent years, “the purpose of the rule has been said to shield the represented client 
from improper approaches”). Commentators have noted this shift. See, e.g., Sophie Hager Hume, 
Comment, Niesig v. Team I: Permitting Ex Parte Communication with Corporate Employees, 57 
Brook. L. Rev. 953, 957 (1991); Stephen M. Sinaiko, Note, Ex Parte Communication and the 
Corporate Adversary: A New Approach, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1456, 1463–64 (1991). 
 28. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2008). 
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assures the confidentiality of the nonclient’s communications with the 
lawyer.29 
Courts and commentators have elaborated on the ways in which 
Rule 4.2 serves its three functions of protecting the client, the lawyer, 
and the client-lawyer relationship.30 They have explained that the Rule 
guards a party against rhetorical attack by opposing counsel, which could 
undermine the party’s confidence in her lawyer’s competence and 
assessment of a case.31 The Rule prevents opposing counsel from causing 
a party to ignore her lawyer’s advice and from “driving a wedge” 
between a party and her lawyer.32 And it protects the attorney-client 
privilege—critical to a strong client-lawyer relationship—by precluding 
inadvertent or legally imprudent disclosures of privileged information.33 
This last function—protection of the attorney-client privilege—is 
thought by many to be the core function of Rule 4.2. Our constitutional 
tradition honors the attorney-client privilege as a rule of privacy and of 
protection of citizens from the force of government coercion, even while 
accepting that the privilege can sometimes obstruct access to truth.34 The 
merits of this trade-off may be debatable, and the traditional value 
placed on the privilege has been periodically challenged, but it remains a 
central feature of legal representation.35 Rule 4.2’s role in reinforcing its 
protections is therefore critical. 
 
 29. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b (citation omitted). 
 30. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (no-contact 
rule “safeguard[s] the client-lawyer relationship from interference by adverse counsel”). 
 31. See, e.g., Univ. Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 327–28 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Polycast 
Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1082, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); N.Y.C. Bar Inquiry Ref. No. 80-46, supra note 
17. 
 32. Polycast, 129 F.R.D. at 625. 
 33. See, e.g., United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1983); Univ. Patents, 737 F. Supp. at 
327; Polycast, 129 F.R.D. at 625; N.Y.C. Bar Inquiry Ref. No. 80-46, supra note 17; see also Sherman L. 
Cohn, The Organizational Client: Attorney-Client Privilege and the No-Contact Rule, 10 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 739, 744 (1997); Jerome N. Krulewitch, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate Parties: The 
Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications with One of Adverse Interest, 82 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1274, 1278 (1988). 
 34. See Charles Tilford McCormick et al., McCormick on Evidence § 87, at 204–05 (3d ed. 
1984); 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 503(02), at 503–16 
(1990). 
 35. See Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2008). The privilege’s central role has recently been reaffirmed 
by new DOJ regulations, issued by Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip, which change previous 
policy and forbid federal prosecutors from requesting a corporation to waive the attorney client and/or 
work product privilege in exchange for lenient treatment. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States 
Attorneys’ Manual 9-28.710 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-
guidelines.pdf; see also Mark R. Filip, Deputy U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at Press Conference 
Announcing Revisions to Corporate Charging Guidelines (Aug. 28, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2008/dag-speech-0808286.html) (announcing and explaning 
the new guidelines). 
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Rule 4.2’s protections extend beyond the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege, however. Applied strictly according to its terms, the Rule 
effectively insulates represented individuals from all informal interviews 
and investigations. Accordingly, it guards against the inadvertent or 
imprudent disclosures of unprivileged as well as privileged information—
information of a kind a client may ultimately have to disclose in 
deposition. Courts have recognized this broad protection, speaking of the 
Rule as functioning to decrease the chances that a represented person 
will disclose harmful information.36 Lawyers place a high value on this 
function, since a client’s disclosure of any kind can seriously damage a 
litigation position. But granting lawyers complete professional control of 
information produces debatable effects—potentially protecting clients 
against legal responsibility for their conduct and inhibiting the search for 
truth. 
Rule 4.2’s effects are debatable in other respects as well. For 
example, the Rule can function to favor those who are wealthy or 
sophisticated enough to have a lawyer on retainer.37 The Rule’s 
protections, as well as those of the attorney-client privilege, are available 
to litigants as soon as they engage legal counsel. Inevitably, however, 
legal representation is more readily available to individuals who are 
sophisticated and affluent than individuals who are not.  
By affording protection against disclosure of harmful information to 
individuals who retain counsel, Rule 4.2 enhances the practical value of 
legal representation and therefore the economic value of the lawyer’s 
services. This highlights the Rule’s third and less noted function—
protecting lawyers’ interests in their relationships with clients. An ABA 
opinion recognized that the Rule’s prohibition is “imperative in the right 
and interest of the adverse party and his attorney,”38 and the California 
Supreme Court explained that “[t]he rule was designed to permit an 
attorney to function adequately in his proper role and to prevent the 
opposing attorney from impeding his performance in such role.”39 In 
granting lawyers full control over all communications, the Rule can also 
serve less legitimate interests of the lawyer. John Leubsdorf notes the 
 
 36. See, e.g., Univ. Patents, 737 F. Supp. at 327; Polycast, 129 F.R.D. at 625. 
 37. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Fitterer, 
710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 223–24 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, 
State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena 
Rules, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 291, 340 (1992); John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer’s 
Client: The Lawyer’s Veto and the Client’s Interest, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 683, 702 (1979). 
 38. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934) (emphasis added); see 
also United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1451–52 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 39. Mitton v. State Bar, 455 P.2d 753, 758 (Cal. 1969); see also In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 485 
(D.N.M. 1992) (stating that the rule is designed “‘to ensure that the adverse party’s attorney can 
function properly’” (quoting Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1447–49)). 
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possibility of a lawyer delaying the transmittal of a settlement offer in 
order to prolong a case and increase fees.40 Another possibility is a 
lawyer intentionally taking a position in tone or substance that prolongs 
or exacerbates differences that the parties could otherwise resolve. 
To minimize the dangers of a no-contact rule that favors 
sophisticated and affluent individuals or that allows lawyers to protect 
their own interests at the expense of clients’, we propose two changes to 
common conceptions of Model Rule 4.2’s function. First, we propose that 
the Rule be understood primarily in terms of protecting the client-lawyer 
relationship, not the client or the lawyer individually. Comment 1 to 
Model Rule 4.2 currently explains that the Rule “contributes to the 
proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has 
chosen to be represented by a lawyer.”41 While protecting the “proper 
functioning of the legal system” is a central purpose of all ethical rules, it 
is not clear that this purpose is always and necessarily served by 
protecting “a person . . . represented by a lawyer.”42 To the contrary, 
there is no apparent justification for giving a represented person 
protection above and beyond the existing protections of effective 
representation. Accordingly, we propose modifying Comment 1 to focus 
clearly and unambiguously on protection of the client-lawyer 
relationship. 
Additionally, we think that conceptions of Rule 4.2’s proper function 
should account for the various and often competing interests implicated 
by the Rule. As noted in the introduction, the corpus of ethical rules has 
increasingly recognized the need to balance countervailing interests.43 
For example, the idea of absolute loyalty to the client has been qualified 
by duties of candor to the court and to nonclients and by an enlarged 
scope of self-protection for lawyers against clients who turn out to be 
dishonest and criminal.44 The protection afforded client confidences, 
meanwhile, has been qualified to allow a lawyer to disclose information 
to interdict substantial unlawful injuries to third parties and to defend 
himself against implication in a client’s wrongdoing.45 
 
 40. Leubsdorf, supra note 37, at 689–90. 
 41. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 1 (2008). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyering in a Hybrid Adversary System, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
45, 49 (1996). See generally John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1021 (1982). In large part, this is to respond to criticisms that a pure model subordinates truth in 
the hierarchy or values and leads to distributional injustice, and in recognition that loyalty to a client 
can sometimes impose unacceptable costs on third parties. See, e.g., Marvin Frankel, The Search for 
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975). 
 44. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1–.4. 
 45. In 2003, Model Rule 1.6(b) was revised to add the following additional exceptions permitting 
adverse disclosure of confidential information: 
  (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in 
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No such qualifications have been made to Rule 4.2—either to 
conceptions of its proper function or to its application in practice. This is 
not because countervailing interests are not implicated. To the contrary, 
Rule 4.2 affects various interests of the adversary, third parties, and the 
legal system as a whole. Primary among these is an interest in informal 
factfinding—an alternative to formal discovery that provides several 
advantages to adverse parties and the legal system as a whole but that 
Rule 4.2 effectively precludes.46 Informal factfinding limits the financial 
and time burdens placed on the parties and on courts.47 It allows lawyers 
to fulfill their Rule 11 duty to substantiate claims prior to filing suit48 
when formal discovery has not yet become unavailable.49 And it may 
produce more relevant and useful information, as witnesses may speak 
more freely in an informal ex parte interview than in the more 
intimidating atmosphere of a formal deposition. Moreover, it affords the 
investigating lawyer confidentiality in developing a theory of the case 
and producing attorney work product.50 Rule 4.2 effectively deprives 
litigants of all of these benefits of informal discovery. 
Rule 4.2 interferes with various third-party interests as well. An 
individual in danger of imminent harm at the hands of a represented 
person has an interest in a direct warning from that person’s lawyer. A 
whistleblower within a represented organization has an interest in 
speaking with outside opposing counsel without first gaining approval 
from the organization’s lawyer. And society has an interest in effective 
crime prevention and just resolution of disputes. Even the client covered 
by Rule 4.2 has an interest that goes unnoticed by the Rule—namely, 
autonomy within the client-lawyer relationship. 
In reconsidering the Rule’s proper formulation and application, we 
think that these interests should be explicitly addressed. Just as other 
rules of attorney conduct have been modified to account for the full 
range of implicated interests, so too should the obligations of Rule 4.2 be 
modified to account for the competing interests of the adversary, third 
parties, and the justice system as a whole. Accordingly, we propose 
replacing Model Rule 4.2’s current Comment 1 with the following: 
 
furtherance of which the client used or is using the lawyer’s services; 
  (3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property 
of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission 
of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services[.] 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2004); cf. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 
1.6(b) (2003). 
 46. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100(2) cmt. b. 
 47. Id. § 99 cmt. b. 
 48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1 (2008). 
 49. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1). 
 50. See, e.g., IBM v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by 
protecting the client-lawyer relationship against interference by other 
lawyers participating in the matter. It protects against another lawyer’s 
influence that might undermine a client’s confidence in his or her 
lawyer, or lead a client to disclose privileged or confidential 
information, to refrain from pursuing claims or a course of action, to 
agree to a settlement, or to take other action without the advice of 
counsel. These interests are not unlimited and must be balanced with 
accommodation of the functions of informal investigation and fact-
finding in limiting costs, substantiating claims, and promoting 
legitimate law enforcement activities.51 
This articulation of Rule 4.2’s purpose forms the foundation of our 
critique of the Rule’s practical application, and our proposal for its 
reform is set forth in the next Part. 
III.  Rule 4.2’s Application 
As currently articulated and applied, Rule 4.2 leads to results that 
are sometimes undesirable and other times unpredictable. The efforts in 
some decisions to accommodate competing interests have resulted in a 
discrepancy between the text of the Rule and the meanings it has been 
given.52 To explain and address these problems, this Part reviews eight 
contexts in which the proper application of Rule 4.2 is either unclear or 
unjust: (1) law enforcement investigations, (2) communications with 
government officials, (3) other communications that have been 
interpreted by courts as “authorized by law,” (4) communications 
initiated by represented persons, (5) communications responding to 
emergencies, (6) communications by a lawyer who is a party to a matter, 
(7) communications with constituents of a represented organization, and 
(8) communications with putative members of a class. After reviewing 
the difficulties presented by each context, we propose modifications to 
the Rule to better effectuate what we consider to be its principal 
function—safeguarding the client-lawyer relationship, while 
acknowledging and balancing countervailing interests. The text of 
current Model Rule 4.2 is attached in Appendix 1 and the text of our 
proposed revision is attached in Appendix 2. 
A. Law Enforcement Investigations 
Rule 4.2 has two exceptions to its prohibition on communication by 
a lawyer with a person represented by another lawyer.53 Communications 
are allowed if (i) consented to by the represented person’s lawyer, or (ii) 
authorized by law.54 The first of these is merely formal; it is implausible 
 
 51. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 1.  
 52. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 
Vand. L. Rev. 381, 460 (2002) (noting problems of “implementing haphazard exceptions”). 
 53. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2. 
 54. Id. 
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that a lawyer representing a client would consent to direct contact in 
circumstances in which the Rule’s protective purpose is implicated. 
Operatively, therefore, the Rule has only one exception—
communications “authorized by law.” 
The opaque phrase “authorized by law” originally appeared in DR 
7-104 of the 1970 Model Code and was adopted by the drafters of Model 
Rule 4.2 in 1983 with full awareness of its ambiguity.55 The current Model 
Rule provides no definition of the phrase, and the only guidance it offers 
are two illustrations, both of which are hopelessly vague—“investigative 
activities of lawyers representing governmental entities” and 
“communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a 
constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the 
government.”56  
The Rule’s application in the context of investigatory activities has a 
long and contentious history, which gained prominence after the Second 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hammad.57 There, the Second 
Circuit held that Rule 4.2 prohibited communications with suspects of a 
criminal investigation prior to the initiation of formal proceedings.58 The 
original opinion was withdrawn and replaced by an opinion conceding 
that “legitimate investigation techniques” can sometimes be “authorized 
by law,”59 but the Department of Justice (DOJ) nevertheless reacted with 
alarm. The DOJ worried that the decision would deprive government 
lawyers of important tools of investigation and would chill their 
investigative efforts.60 Accordingly, in June 1989, Attorney General 
Richard Thornburgh issued a departmental memorandum stating that 
the law enforcement activities of DOJ lawyers were “authorized” by 
federal law and therefore exempt from application of states’ no-contact 
rules.61 The defense bar and the ABA countered that the memorandum’s 
approach was impermissible in so far as it attempted to exempt DOJ 
lawyers from the ethical obligations generally applicable to lawyers.62 
 
 55. See, e.g., 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering 
§ 38.9 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2008); Cramton & Udell, supra note 37, at 318–28; F. Dennis Saylor IV & 
J. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of Model Rule 4.2 to 
Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 459 (1992); Todd S. Schulman, Wisdom Without Power: The 
Department of Justice’s Attempt to Exempt Federal Prosecutors from State No-Contact Rules, 71 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1067, 1074–78 (1996). 
 56. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5. 
 57. 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1988), modified, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988).  
 58. Id. at 858–59. 
 59. Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839. 
 60. See Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (2008). 
 61. Memorandum from Richard L. Thornburgh, U.S. Attorney Gen., to All Justice Department 
Litigators (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489–93 ex. E (D.N.M. 1992).  
 62. See ABA Adds Two Model Rules on Subpoenas, Practice Sales, 6 Laws. Man. on Prof. 
Conduct Current Rep. (ABA/BNA) 25, 27 (Feb. 28, 1990) (noting ABA resolution opposing “any 
attempt by the Department of Justice unilaterally to exempt its lawyers from the professional conduct 
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In 1994, the DOJ issued a new no-contact rule, applicable to all 
federal prosecutors and endeavoring to carry the force of law.63 Termed 
the Reno Regulation, its stated purpose was “to ensure that government 
attorneys adhere to the highest ethical standards, while eliminating the 
uncertainty and confusion arising from the variety of interpretations of 
state rules, some of which have been incorporated as local court rules in 
a number of federal district courts.”64 The Reno Regulation purported to 
preempt and supersede state ethical rules, but unlike the Thornburgh 
memorandum, it gave specific guidance about what types of investigatory 
contacts were permissible. These included contacts occurring “up until 
the point at which [the contacted individuals] are arrested or charged 
with a crime or named as defendants in a civil law enforcement action.”65 
The Regulation explicitly stated that it “d[id] not permit federal 
prosecutors to attempt to negotiate plea agreements, settlements, or 
similar arrangements with individuals represented by counsel without the 
consent of their attorneys.”66 
Paralleling the negative response to the Thornburgh memorandum 
and notwithstanding substantial differences in the Reno version, the 
ABA, defense lawyers, and many commentators objected on two 
grounds: first, that the DOJ could not hold its attorneys to unique ethical 
standards; and second, that the DOJ lacked authority to promulgate 
regulations that preempted state ethics rules and superseded federal 
court rules.67 The DOJ responded that the regulation had been adopted 
under its rulemaking power and carried the full force and effect of law.68 
Disagreement then centered on whether the DOJ’s rulemaking power 
encompassed the authority to promulgate ethical rules.69 
In 1998, Congress weighed in.70 Explicitly rejecting the DOJ’s 
attempts to regulate federal prosecutors’ contacts with represented 
persons, it adopted what came to be known as the McDade 
 
rules that apply to all lawyers under applicable rules of the jurisdictions in which they practice”); Tom 
Watson, AG Decrees Prosecutors May Bypass Counsel, Legal Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at 1. 
 63. See Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); Jeffrey Kanige, 
Ex Parte Interviews: Bright Lines, Big Debate, N.J. L.J., June 13, 1994, at 5; Maria B. Rubin, The 
Thornburgh Memo, Now the Reno Rule: A Case of Ethics, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 23, 1994, at 1; see also 
Schulman, supra note 55, at 1093–111. 
 68. Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77; see also Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, 
supra note 55. 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998); In re 
Howes, 940 P.2d 159, 164–68 (N.M. 1997). For a discussion of this controversy, see Schulman, supra 
note 55, at 1093–111. 
 70. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006). 
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Amendment.71 The Amendment provides: “An attorney for the 
Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal 
court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney 
engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same 
manner as other attorneys in that State.”72 The effect of the Amendment 
is to apply state no-contact rules to federal prosecutors just as they apply 
to state prosecutors (and to all other lawyers). Commentators have noted 
significant differences between the activities of state and federal 
prosecutors, however, rendering this approach problematic.73 State 
investigations are typically conducted by the police, who are not subject 
to Rule 4.2; state prosecutors become involved only after an arrest has 
been made.74 Federal investigations, in contrast, are more likely to 
involve federal prosecutors from their inception.75 Federal prosecutors 
are also more likely to prosecute complex and ongoing crimes, and rely 
upon coordinated investigations and complex surveillance techniques.76 
Tension is ongoing between DOJ lawyers, who want to exercise 
supervisory authority over investigations, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI), which seeks autonomy.77 The tension continues 
notwithstanding the FBI’s nominally subordinate position to the DOJ. 
Classifying the FBI as an independent agency (rather than a subordinate 
instrument of the DOJ) would allow it to conduct more intrusive 
communication with suspects, because Rule 4.2 would not apply and 
federal investigations would therefore have fewer constraints. As the 
DOJ and commentators have noted, this is a perverse consequence.78 
The DOJ also notes that federal prosecutors are more likely than 
state prosecutors to be involved in investigations that extend across state 
lines.79 The McDade Amendment could therefore subject a federal 
 
 71. Id. For a discussion of the McDade Amendment, see Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the 
“American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 599, 625, 650–56 (2004). 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 530B. 
 73. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 Geo. L.J. 
207, 216 (2000); Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 2080, 2090 (2000) [hereinafter Federal Prosecutors]. 
 74. Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55; Zacharias & Green, supra note 73, at 237. 
 75. Zacharias & Green, supra note 73, at 237. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 749, 821–23 (2003). 
 78. See id.; see also The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 94 (1999) 
(statement of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., in response to questions from Sen. Leahy) (noting that it is 
“highly desirable that Government lawyers supervise investigations by federal agents” because the 
lawyers “know the rules better and the risks . . . of violating the rules”); Federal Prosecutors, supra 
note 73, at 2091. 
 79. Federal Prosecutors, supra note 73, at 2091. 
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prosecutor to multiple and inconsistent state standards.80 The inevitable 
result, the DOJ contends, will be a chilling of investigative efforts and a 
decrease in effective law enforcement.81 On the one hand, this risk may 
be largely theoretical. The rule in effect in most states is nearly uniform 
in its text.82 On the other hand, differences in judicial interpretations 
may, in fact, pose problems of conflicting guidance. 
In any event, the McDade Amendment does not address the key 
issue of what communications are “authorized by law” and therefore 
permissible.83 Relying on this ambiguity, the DOJ continues to assert the 
validity of its policy that certain lawful investigatory techniques are 
authorized by law and permissible under the Rule. Courts, meanwhile, 
continue to disagree on whether Rule 4.2 applies to federal prosecutors 
engaged in investigations that are otherwise entirely lawful.84 
Attempting to reconcile the positions of the DOJ, Congress, and the 
defense bar, the ABA’s Ethics Committee and the Ethics 2000 
Commission recommended substantial amendments to Model Rule 4.2 in 
2002.85 Among other changes, the amendments would have authorized (i) 
communications with represented persons by federal agents acting under 
direction of government lawyers prior to the initiation of formal law 
enforcement proceedings, and (ii) communications with a represented 
organization’s agent or employee who initiated a communication relating 
to a law enforcement investigation.86 The ABA declined to adopt the 
proposed amendments. 
The debate over the “authorized by law” exception continues. 
Particularly problematic is the relationship between the exception and 
the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants. There is 
substantial overlap between the protections of the no-contact rule and 
those of the Constitution, since the right-to-counsel protections of the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibit direct contact in some 
preindictment and most postindictment contexts.87 The overlap is not 
 
 80. Id.; Green & Zacharias, supra note 52, at 459. 
 81. See Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (2008). 
 82. See American Legal Ethics Library, Topical Overview: Index of Narratives, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/comparative/index.htm#4.2 (last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (listing of 
states’ formulations of the rule).  
 83. Nor does it abrogate decisions holding that preindictment communications are “authorized by 
law.” See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Reference Man. (ABA/BNA) 71:303 (Oct. 29. 2008) (citing 
cases). 
 84. Id. 71:301. 
 85. See ABA Ethics Groups Recommend Changes to Model Rule on Ex Parte Communication, 15 
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Current Rep. (ABA/BNA) 347, 347 (July 21, 1999). 
 86. See id. 
 87. Before indictment, the Fifth Amendment prohibits contact with a suspect in custody who has 
invoked the right to counsel. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477 (1980). After indictment, the Sixth Amendment prohibits contact, initiated by the prosecutor, with 
a defendant regarding the indicted crime without the presence of counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 
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complete, however, and the question arises whether a prosecutor’s 
communication with a represented person, lawful under the Constitution, 
is nevertheless impermissible under Rule 4.2. The policies supporting the 
Rule’s prohibition are particularly compelling in the context of criminal 
law enforcement proceedings, since “[n]ot only are criminal 
interrogations more formidable and the potential consequences of a 
criminal action more severe than in civil litigation, but the criminal client 
seems more likely to be unsophisticated.”88 But effective law 
enforcement could be severely hampered by strict application of Rule 
4.2. Moreover, there is a persuasive argument for deference to the 
constitutional standards, which were designed to strike a proper balance 
between the interests of the defendant and those of society. 
Currently, Comment 5 to the Model Rule 4.2 offers the following 
guidance: 
When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a 
government lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to honoring 
the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that a communication 
does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to 
establish that the communication is permissible under this Rule.89 
The Comment’s position—that Rule 4.2 can prohibit contacts that the 
Constitution would allow—does not settle the matter. It is 
understandable that the ABA (as official author of the Comment) did 
not wish to pronounce on constitutional law or on decisional law 
interpretations of the “authorized by law” exception. But the 
unfortunate result was a comment with little meaningful direction or 
guidance, which has created much confusion. 
Comment 5’s guidance has been questioned by some authorities and 
rejected by others.90 Among the jurisdictions struggling with the issue is 
California. In the course of that state’s commendable effort to harmonize 
its unique Rules of Professional Conduct with the ABA Model Rules, 
the drafters encountered the ambiguities and conflicts of Rule 4.2. An 
initial issue was whether “authorized” should mean “specifically 
permitted” (which would be unusual for legislation) or “not prohibited” 
(which would make the constitutional and ethical rules coextensive in 
scope). In the course of deliberating over this distinction, DOJ lawyers 
from California revealed themselves to be in a paradoxical situation. In 
 
U.S. 387 (1976); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1963). 
 88. Cramton & Udell, supra note 37, at 327. 
 89. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (2008). 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 1996); Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 
48 F.3d 640, 650–51 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Powe, 9 F.3d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 
1366 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1339 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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the special drafting committee, federal prosecutors advocated use of 
“permitted by law” as the operative phrase. But when in court to defend 
contact with a suspect or an accused, they have argued that “authorized” 
means “not prohibited.”91 
The answers to three unsettled questions will be critical to resolving 
the issue of when and to what extent prosecutors—particularly federal 
prosecutors—may directly contact or arrange contact with represented 
suspects. First, is it permissible for a prosecuting authority governed by a 
no-contact rule to communicate with a represented person prior to the 
initiation of formal law enforcement proceedings? Second, is such 
communication permissible with a criminal defendant who has validly 
waived the right to counsel and attempted to waive the no-contact rule? 
Third, is direct communication with a represented defendant permissible 
if it addresses “unrelated” matters? And how is “unrelated” defined? 
Most authorities answer the first question—whether it is permissible 
to communicate with a represented person prior to the initiation of 
formal law enforcement proceedings and therefore prior to attachment 
of Sixth Amendment rights—in the affirmative.92 In United States v. 
Balter, a Third Circuit panel reviewed case law from several circuits and 
concluded that “with the exception of the Second Circuit [in Hammad], 
every court of appeals that has considered a similar case has held . . . that 
[no-contact rules] do not apply to preindictment criminal investigations 
by government attorneys.”93 Most state courts have drawn similar 
conclusions,94 rejecting Comment 5’s position that constitutionally-
permissible contacts are not necessarily ethically permissible. 
The Model Rule answers the second question—whether a 
prosecutor can communicate with a defendant who initiates contact and 
 
 91. As observed by one of the Authors during consultations, the federal lawyers argued while in 
court that the term covered their activity but then changed their argument during the California Rules 
revision process, wanting a clear cover. 
 92. See, e.g., Balter, 91 F.3d at 436; Simels, 48 F.3d at 650; Powe, 9 F.3d at 70; Heinz, 983 F.2d at 
612; Ryans, 903 F.2d at 739; Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840; Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1366; Fitterer, 710 F.2d at 
1333; Kenny, 645 F.2d at 1339; see also Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.10. 
 93. 91 F.3d at 436. The reasoning of these decisions differ. Some courts view such contacts as 
authorized by law. See, e.g., id.; Powe, 9 F.3d at 69. Some courts focus on the strong public interest in 
effective law enforcement. See, e.g., Ryans, 903 F.2d at 740; Fitterer, 710 F.2d at 1333. Some courts 
reason that the subject matter of the representation is undefined during the investigatory stage, such 
that the rule cannot be violated. See, e.g., Ryans, 903 F.2d at 739; United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. 
Supp. 1430, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 94. See, e.g., State v. Wolf, 643 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 
457, 467 (Minn. 1999); State v. Maloney, 698 N.W.2d 583, 588 (Wis. 2005). This interpretation is not 
uniform, however. Some states have interpreted the rule to proscribe certain contacts that are 
constitutionally permissible. See People v. White, 567 N.E.2d 1368, 1386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). For a 
discussion of state standards, see generally Schulman, supra note 55, at 1069–70, and Alafair S.R. 
Burke, Reconciling Professional Ethics and Prosecutorial Power: The No-Contact Rule Debate, 46 
Stan. L. Rev. 1635, 1636 (1994). 
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waives his right to consult counsel—in the negative. Comment 3 states 
that “[t]he Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or 
consents to the communication.”95 In addition, committee notes explain 
that Comment 5 was intended to “preclude the notion that an ex parte 
communication with a represented person is permitted at the time of 
arrest merely because the represented person waives the constitutional 
right to consult counsel.”96 The DOJ strongly opposes this position, 
however, arguing that if a defendant is deemed capable of waiving his 
constitutional right to counsel, he should be deemed capable of waiving 
the protections of the no-contact rule.97 Many commentators agree, 
contending that represented defendants—who often believe that their 
interests will be served by contacting a prosecutor—should be 
empowered to do so.98 
A majority of courts reject this position, holding that a defendant 
cannot waive the no-contact rule’s protections under any circumstances.99 
An often cited example is United States v. Lopez.100 Under the facts of 
that case, a federal prosecutor met with an indicted defendant at the 
defendant’s request to discuss a plea bargain. The defendant’s lawyer 
had conditioned representation on the defendant foregoing plea 
negotiations—an agreement that precluded the defendant from 
requesting his lawyer’s consent. After negotiations broke down, the 
defense lawyer resigned and successor counsel moved to dismiss the 
indictment for violation of the Sixth Amendment and California’s no-
contact rule.101 Noting that the no-contact rule applies even when a 
defendant willingly consents to a communication, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the communication violated the ethical rule but not the 
 
 95. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2008); Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic 
Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule 4.2 (Part III), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 643, 665 (2003) 
[hereinafter Pierce, Part III]. 
 96. Pierce, Part III, supra note 95 (quoting Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 reporter’s 
observations (Public Discussion Draft, Feb. 21, 2000)). 
 97. 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576, 581–84 (1980). The DOJ’s concern can be illustrated by a 
defendant, part of an organized crime ring, who wants to offer evidence in exchange for a lighter 
sentence. The defendant is represented by a lawyer retained by the crime ring. Fearing the 
repercussions, the defendant is unwilling to divulge information without the assurance of 
confidentiality. If the no-contact rule applies, the prosecutor will have to forego the information. See 
Saylor IV & Wilson, supra note 55, at 459–60. 
 98.  Cramton & Udell, supra note 37, at 298; Pierce, Part III, supra note 95, at 666; Saylor IV & 
Wilson, supra note 55, at 471–72. 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 
486–87 (D.N.M. 1992); State v. Morgan, 646 P.2d 1064, 1069–70 (Kan. 1982); People v. Green, 274 
N.W.2d 448, 453 (Mich. 1979); see also Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.9 illus. 38.5 
(concerning prosecution’s communication with the accused outside the presence of his attorney). But 
see United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding defendant can willingly consent 
to conversation with the prosecution without his attorney’s presence).  
 100. 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 101. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1463. 
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Sixth Amendment.102 In a subsequent formal opinion, the ABA 
acknowledged that this approach to defendant-initiated contacts may 
seem “paternalistic.” It nevertheless concluded that preventing 
uninformed waiver of the rule’s protections is necessary to protect the 
effectiveness of a lawyer’s representation.103 
The third issue to be addressed concerns the definition of the phrase 
“the subject matter of the representation.”104 Comment 4 of the Model 
Rule reveals the significance of this phrase by explaining that “[t]his 
Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented person, or an 
employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters outside the 
representation.”105 The question is whether matters that are outside the 
scope of formal charges (and therefore subject to constitutionally 
permissible inquiries)106 are also “outside the representation” within the 
definition of Rule 4.2.107 
The DOJ views a defendant as represented only on the pending 
charges and contends that communication on other matters is therefore 
permissible.108 Some commentators agree, arguing that government 
lawyers should be permitted to question a defendant regarding any 
uncharged criminal offenses.109 Courts, meanwhile, have come to 
divergent results. Some courts interpret the Rule to prohibit only 
communications concerning matters within the scope of the charge. In 
United States v. Masullo, for example, the Second Circuit concluded that 
federal agents had not violated Rule 4.2 when they questioned a 
defendant who was represented on a state narcotics charge regarding 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); see also Hazard, 
Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.9 illus. 38.5 (“The system as a whole is well served if a lawyer is at 
least given the opportunity to counsel his client about waiving his rights.”). 
 104. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 (2008). 
 105. Id. cmt. 4 (emphasis added); see also Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Reference Man. 
(ABA/BNA) 71:306 (Oct. 29, 2008) (citing cases). 
 106. Prosecutorial communications with an accused are constitutionally permissible when 
addressing matters that are outside the scope of formal charges, even if the subject matter of the 
communication has some kind of transactional relationship to the matters covered in the formal 
charge. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel attaches only regarding the 
particular crime charged, and that investigatory contacts regarding crimes for which the right to 
counsel has not attached are constitutionally permissible. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167–72 (2001). 
The Court has reasoned that to hold otherwise “would unnecessarily frustrate the public’s interest in 
the investigation of criminal activities.” Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). 
 107. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. d (2000) (“What 
matter or matters are involved in a representation depends on the circumstances.”). 
 108. See 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576, 589 (1980) (“The fact that a person has retained counsel 
to represent him in one criminal charge would not prohibit interviews concerning unrelated matters.”); 
see also Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule 4.2 
(Part II), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 321, 350–51 (2003) [hereinafter Pierce, Part II]. 
 109. See, e.g., Schulman, supra note 55, at 1079–80. 
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federal charges for which the defendant was not yet represented.110 Other 
courts take a broader approach, interpreting the Rule to ban 
communications concerning transactionally-related matters. In United 
States v. Hammad, for example, a violation was based on a prosecutorial 
communication regarding an arson investigation with a defendant 
represented on related charges of Medicare fraud.111 Still other courts 
take the broadest approach possible, interpreting the Rule to ban 
communication regarding any and all matters, even if completely 
unrelated.112 
Complicating these questions is the issue of Rule 4.2’s proper 
application to investigators acting at a lawyer’s direction. Comment 4 of 
the Model Rule currently provides that “[a] lawyer may not make a 
communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another.”113 It 
then references Model Rule 8.4, which prohibits a lawyer from violating 
any ethical rule through the acts of another.114 Under the prevailing 
consensus, these provisions mean that a lawyer cannot advise or direct an 
associate, partner, or other agent to engage in communications that 
would be prohibited if engaged in by the lawyer.115 They do not mean, 
however, that a lawyer cannot advise a client regarding direct 
communications with another represented person in the matter.116 
There is disagreement about communications through a third 
group—investigators and other law enforcement personnel acting at the 
direction of lawyers. Some states allow such communications, at least 
during the investigatory phase of a case.117 Other states specify that the 
Rule applies to indirect as well as direct communications, and effectively 
 
 110. 489 F.2d 217, 222–24 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Johnson v. State, 900 S.W.2d 940, 950 (Ark. 
1995); K-Mart Corp. v. Helton, 894 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ky. 1995); State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659, 669 
(W. Va. 1980). 
 111. 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 112. See, e.g., People v. Sharp, 197 Cal. Rptr. 436, 438–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); In re Burrows, 629 
P.2d 820, 824–25 (Or. 1981) (finding that prosecutorial communication about undercover drug 
activities with a defendant charged with rape and robbery without his attorney’s presence was a 
violation of the no-contact rule); Or. State Bar Op. 484 (Mar. 1983). 
 113. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (2008); see also Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers § 99(2) cmt. k (2000).  
 114. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(a); see also id. 5.3(c)(1) (prohibiting ordering or 
knowingly ratifying conduct by nonlawyer assistant that would be a violation if engaged in by lawyer). 
 115. See Pierce, Part II, supra note 108, at 338. 
 116. The comments to the Model Rule specifically authorize clients to communicate directly with 
each other and lawyers to advise clients in such communications. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
R. 4.2 cmt. 4; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. k; ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-362 (1992) (indicating lawyers have a duty 
to discuss communications the client desires to engage in with the opposing party). Some states’ rules 
explicitly authorize lawyers to encourage clients to directly communicate with the adverse party. See 
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Reference Man. (ABA/BNA) 71:302 (Oct. 29, 2008). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 849 F. Supp. 417, 418 (D. Md. 1994); United States v. 
Infelise, 773 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
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precludes all investigatory contacts.118 The DOJ argues strenuously with 
this position, contending that involving government lawyers in the 
planning and execution of law enforcement investigations is desirable 
because it will ensure that the investigations comply with the law and 
afford sufficient respect to the rights of all involved.119 
We believe it is poor public policy to leave these matters in 
continuing debate and uncertainty; doing so jeopardizes legitimacy in law 
enforcement. Rule 4.2 should therefore explicitly address its application 
to law enforcement investigations. Our proposal is to add a new 
subsection (c) to the Rule, which specifies (in part) that: “(c) A 
communication is authorized by law when it is in connection with: (1) a 
lawful investigation by or under authority of a public law enforcement or 
regulatory agency.”120 
To further clarify what constitutes “law” authorizing a 
communication under this exception, we propose adding a new sentence 
to the relevant Comment, which reads: “Communications authorized by 
law include communications that a lawyer is authorized to make under 
federal and state constitutional law, statute, agency regulation having the 
force of law, or decision or rule of a court of competent jurisdiction.”121 
This articulation of the exception for law enforcement activities strikes 
an appropriate balance between the interests served by the Rule 
(protection of the target of an investigation), and those served by the 
exception (the public’s interest in effective law enforcement). It 
acknowledges that when government lawyers comply with constitutional 
standards and other law, the government’s interest in efficiently and 
effectively investigating crimes outweighs a represented person’s interest 
in protection against informal communications. And it recognizes that 
the no-contact rule’s proper function is not to protect a represented 
person against revelation of all damaging or otherwise probative 
evidence, or to prevent the government from acquiring relevant 
 
 118. See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2-100(a) (2008) (“While representing a client, a 
member shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject of the representation with a 
party the member knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member has 
the consent of the other lawyer.”); La. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 (2008) (providing that a 
lawyer “shall not effect the prohibited communication through a third person, including the lawyer’s 
client”). 
 119. The DOJ has “encouraged federal prosecutors to play a larger role in pre-indictment, pre-
arrest investigations,” because “greater participation of lawyers at the pre-indictment stage of law 
enforcement has been regarded as helpful in assuring that police investigations comply with legal and 
ethical standards.” Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (2008); see also Green 
& Zacharias, supra note 52, at 459. 
 120. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(c)(1). 
 121. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 8. 
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information.122 Rather, it is to protect the client-lawyer relationship to the 
extent consistent with other valued interests in the legal system. 
Moreover, concluding that constitutionally permissible 
communications are ethically permissible recognizes that constitutional 
standards emerge from a more rigorous process than do rules of attorney 
conduct.123 As one commentator explained: 
  The cases deciding when suspects are entitled to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment have emerged from the crucible of constitutional 
litigation. They are hard cases, requiring the courts to decide, in the 
context of murder, kidnapping, sex offenses, organized crime and other 
serious anti-social activity, where to draw the line between the [sic] 
protecting the rights of suspects, on the one hand, and detecting and 
punishing crime, on the other. . . . In those cases, courts face the fact 
that the price to be paid for respecting the constitutional rights of 
citizens is that, on occasion, a crime will go unpunished, perhaps 
forever. . . . [Courts create rules that] explicitly strike a balance 
between protecting individual rights and punishing criminals.124 
Ethical rules of attorney conduct, although crafted with careful 
deliberation, are the product of a less searching process. They are the 
product of committees of lawyers and scholars and of judicial approval.125 
When it comes to striking a proper balance between the rights of 
criminal defendants and the interests of society, a persuasive case can be 
made that they should be afforded less weight. 
As applied, our proposed language will mean that lawful 
communications are permissible prior to the initiation of formal 
proceedings. After such time, communications will be permissible with a 
defendant who has initiated the contact and executed a valid waiver of 
the right to counsel. Communications will also be permissible regarding 
matters outside the scope of the charges. All such communications will 
be subject to the safeguards of proposed Rule 4.2(b), discussed below. 
Where government lawyers are prohibited from directly 
communicating with a represented person, they should also be prohibited 
from communicating through an investigative agent. However, not all 
indirect communications should be prohibited. Where an investigator, 
 
 122. See, e.g., Humco, Inc. v. Noble, 31 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2000) (“The purpose of Rule 4.2 is 
‘not to prevent the flow of information, even if damaging to a party in a suit.’ Rather, it is to preserve 
the positions of the parties in an adversarial system and thereby to maintain the protections obtained 
by employing counsel and prevent disruption of the attorney-client relationship.” (quoting Aiken v. 
Bus. & Indus. Health Group, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (D. Kan. 1995))). 
 123. Martin S. Murphy, The “No-Contact” Rule and the Sixth Amendment: A Dilemma for the 
Ethical Prosecutor, Boston B.J., Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 8. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 13–18 (4th 
ed. 2005); Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme: Revisiting the ABA’s Revision of Model Rule 
4.2 (Part I), 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 121, 123–38 (2002) [hereinafter Pierce, Part I] (describing the 
amendment process to Rule 4.2). 
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with advice from a lawyer, contacts a represented person in connection 
with an undercover sting operation, the Rule’s proper purpose is not 
implicated. Applying the Rule in this situation would only serve to 
protect the represented person against the disclosure of harmful 
information, not against lawyer overreaching or interference with the 
lawyer-client relationship. Moreover, as noted by the DOJ, lawyers’ 
involvement in investigations may actually safeguard the rights of 
represented persons because government lawyers are governed by the 
special ethical duties prescribed in Model Rule 3.8, which include making 
“reasonable efforts to assure that the accused . . . has been given 
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.”126 Decisional law reinforces 
these obligations.127 
B. Communications with Public Officials 
Clarifying the “authorized by law” exception in the context of law 
enforcement investigations is an important first step in reforming Model 
Rule 4.2; a second is clarifying Comment 5’s second illustration of a 
communication authorized by law: “communications by a lawyer on 
behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to 
communicate with the government.”128 The Restatement (Third) and most 
states’ no-contact rules include this exception.129 But here again, there is 
no agreement as to the exception’s proper scope. 
The primary rationale for the public officials exception derives from 
the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances and the related public interest in open access to 
government.130 However, access would be equally “open” (or even more 
so) if the Rule required that a government lawyer be notified of any 
planned communication with a government official and allowed to be a 
party to such communication. A supporting rationale for the exception is 
the presumed sophistication of government actors, rendering the Rule’s 
protections unnecessary. The Restatement (Third) describes the 
 
 126. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(b) (2008). 
 127. United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 1978) (Ely, J., concurring); H. Richard 
Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of 
Access and Restraint, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1137, 1176–83 (1987) (noting the prosecutor has “the 
paramount professional obligation . . . to promote a just outcome, not a partisan victory”). 
 128. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5. 
 129. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 99(1)(a), 101 & annots. (2000). 
 130. See, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass’n v. St. Albans, 18 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (noting 
that the right to contact and communicate with government officials is right of citizenship); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408 n.9 (1997) (noting that Model Rule 4.2 
is modified by the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances); see 
also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 101 cmt. b (explaining that without 
the exception, the no-contact rule’s application could “compromise the public interest in facilitating 
direct communication between representatives of citizens and government officials reflected in open 
government open-file, freedom of information, and similar enactments”). 
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government’s need for the rule’s protection as “dubious,”131 and the D.C. 
Bar Association, in explaining the exception’s origins, has said: 
 ‘Government officials, especially those who have significant decision 
making authority, are almost always capable of resisting any arguments 
or other suggestions that are not proper and genuinely persuasive. 
Moreover, any government official who is in a high enough position to 
make binding decisions can surely be relied upon to 
exercise . . . individual judgment as to whether to engage in such direct 
communications at all . . . .’132 
This may be true in some circumstances, but the argument does not hold 
for all government officials. A part-time local school board or zoning 
board member might need the rule’s protection as much as any other 
represented individual.133 As the New York City Bar Association 
explained, any given public official “may not know exactly what cases are 
pending against them, the status of those cases, the consequences of 
those cases, or the consequences their statements may have in those 
cases.”134 
The variety of legal contexts in which the exception may apply 
complicates the task of articulating its contours. A lawyer representing a 
private party in a contract dispute may seek to communicate directly with 
the government contracting officer who has the authority to resolve or 
settle the dispute.135 A lawyer for a private party named as a co-
defendant with a municipality may want to interview city employees to 
gather information informally.136 A lawyer representing an individual 
before a licensing board may seek to contact board members directly to 
present a position.137 In these and other scenarios, the public’s interest in 
open access to government, implicated to varying extents, must be 
balanced with the government’s interest in protection against lawyer 
overreaching. 
Various approaches to this balancing task have been suggested. As 
noted, Comment 5 of the Model Rule characterizes communications that 
 
 131. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 101 cmt. b. 
 132. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 340 (2007) (omission in original) (quoting Proposed 
Rules of Professional Conduct and Related Comments 187 (1986)).  
 133. But see Ala. State Bar Gen. Council, Op. 2003-03 (2003) (holding that a lawyer defending 
state board of education in suit by county board of education may communicate directly with members 
of county board of education to discuss settlement); Kan. Bar Ass’n Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 00-
06 (2002) (lawyer permitted to contact city officials regarding client’s zoning application 
notwithstanding city lawyer’s directive to the contrary because “a citizen must always have access to 
his or her government”). 
 134. N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1991-4 (1991). 
 135. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 340 (holding contact did not violate D.C. Rules of 
Professional Conduct R. 4.2). 
 136. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1377 (1977). 
 137. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 280 (1998) (holding proposed contacts did not violate 
D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2). 
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are made by lawyers “exercising a constitutional or other legal right to 
communicate with the government,” as falling within the “authorized by 
law” exception to the Rule’s prohibition.138 This vague comment 
highlights a substantial lack of clarity regarding the constitutional right to 
petition for redress of grievances and other legal rights to communicate 
with the government. Ultimately, it raises more questions than it 
answers. 
An ABA formal opinion in 1997 concluded that a lawyer 
representing a private party in a suit against the government can 
communicate directly with a public official who has authority “to take or 
recommend action in the matter of communication” if two conditions are 
met: (i) the communication is for the purpose of addressing a policy 
issue, and (ii) government counsel is given reasonable advance notice of 
the intent to communicate.139 The ABA opinion concluded that 
notwithstanding this exception, Rule 4.2 applies in full force in contexts 
“where the right to petition has no apparent applicability, either because 
of the position and authority of the official sought to be contacted or 
because of the purpose of the proposed communication.”140 
The Restatement (Third) articulates an exception, independent from 
the “authorized by law” exception, which permits direct communications 
“with employees of a represented governmental agency or with a 
governmental officer being represented in the officer’s official 
capacity.”141 But the Restatement (Third) then articulates an exception to 
this exception: the no-contact rule continues to apply “[i]n negotiation or 
litigation by a lawyer of a specific claim of a client against a 
governmental agency or against a governmental officer in the officer’s 
official capacity.”142 The coherence of this formulation depends on 
definitions of “specific claim” and “official capacity.” The Restatement 
(Third)’s comment offers little additional guidance regarding the 
intended meanings of these phrases, but observes that “[w]hen the 
government is represented in a dispute involving a specific claim, the 
status of the government as client may be closely analogous to that of 
any other organizational party.”143 
Following the Model Rule’s approach, most state bar associations 
and courts have accommodated communications with government actors 
by recognizing exceptions for communications encompassed by the 
vaguely defined constitutional right to petition for redress of 
 
 138. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (2008). 
 139. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408 (1997). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 101(1) (2000). 
 142. Id. § 101(2) (unless the communication relates to an issue of general policy). 
 143. Id. § 101 cmt. c. 
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grievances.144 Where the purpose of a communication is not supported by 
this constitutional right or by the derivative public policy of open access 
to government—for example, where a communication is intended to 
elicit admissions from government officials whose alleged conduct forms 
the basis for a liability claim—the Rule’s prohibition continues to 
apply.145 
In contrast to this majority approach, two jurisdictions—California 
and the District of Columbia—have created broad exceptions that cover 
virtually any communication with a government officer or entity.146 The 
California rule provides that “[t]his rule shall not 
prohibit . . . communications with a public officer, board, committee, or 
body.”147 In similarly broad language, the D.C. rule provides that “[t]his 
rule does not prohibit communication by a lawyer with government 
officials who have the authority to redress the grievances of the lawyer’s 
client, whether or not those grievances or the lawyer’s communications 
relate to matters that are the subject of the representation.”148 Recently, 
the D.C. Bar Ethics Committee clarified that its exception is not limited 
to communications regarding government policy; the exception also 
encompasses communications regarding substantive legal issues.149 
The California and D.C. rules have the advantage of providing clear 
guidance. In doing so, however, they strike a seemingly improper balance 
between the implicated interests. They protect an interest in direct access 
to government actors at great cost to other implicated interests. An 
equally clear rule would be the one suggested in the ABA opinion 
referenced above—contact is permissible on notice to the government 
attorney. 
 
 144. See, e.g., Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corrs., 173 F.R.D. 265, 267–68 (D. Or. 1997); Alaska Bar 
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 94-1 (1994); Ill. State Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 92-3 (1992); N.Y. 
City Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1991-4 (1991); N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 202 
(1995); S.D. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 92-15 (1993); S.D. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 90-70 
(1990); Tex. State Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 474 (1991); Utah State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 115 
(1993). 
 145. Brown, 173 F.R.D. at 267–68; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 97-408 n.15 (1997) (noting that the purpose of the contact must be to petition the 
government, and cannot be “to elicit admissions or confessions from a low-level government employee 
who is in no position to resolve a controversy”). 
 146. Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2-100(C)(1) (2008); D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 
4.2(d) (2007); see also Utah State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 115. 
 147. Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2-100(C)(1). 
 148. D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2(d). The rule adds the condition that the lawyer disclose 
the lawyer’s identity and role in representing an adverse party. See id. cmt. 11 (explaining that the rule 
“is not intended to provide direct access on routine disputes such as ordinary discovery disputes, 
extensions of time or other scheduling matters, or similar routine aspects of the resolution of 
disputes”). 
 149. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 340 (2007); see Julia E. Fish, A Practical Solution to the 
Government Contacts Problem: Opinion 340 Updates the D.C. Exception to the No-Contact Rule, 21 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 739, 743 (2008). 
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We propose a slight variation on this approach. Acknowledging the lack 
of clarity as to what contacts are authorized by independent law, we 
would create an exception for contact with public officials that is 
independent from the “authorized by law” exception and is qualified by 
certain procedural safeguards. Specifically, we would allow 
communications if one of two conditions is met: (i) the public officer 
consents to the communication, or (ii) the communication is written and 
a copy is sent to the government lawyer. To effectuate this change, we 
propose adding a new paragraph (a) to the text of the Model Rule, which 
would state the general prohibition and then list the exceptions. It would 
explain that communications are permissible where “the represented 
person is a public officer or agency and the communication is either 
consented to by the public officer or agency or is in writing with a copy 
sent to the other lawyer.”150 This language strikes an appropriate balance 
between implicated interests. On the one hand, it facilitates certain direct 
communications and prevents government actors from hiding behind the 
rule to avoid accountability. It thereby recognizes that a rule of ethics 
cannot interfere with the public’s right to petition the government. On 
the other hand, it contains procedural safeguards, allowing the public 
official an opportunity to consult with counsel before responding to any 
direct communication. It thereby accounts for the fact that in some 
contexts, public officials need and deserve the rule’s protections as much 
as any private actor. 
When a state or local government agency is involved, reference 
should be made to state constitutional law, instead of or in addition to 
federal constitutional law. We therefore propose adding language to the 
relevant comment to explain that communications permitted “include 
those by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional 
or other legal right to communicate with the government under Federal 
or state law.”151 We also propose adding language to explain that “[t]his 
exception does not encompass communications regarding imminent or 
pending litigation, nor does it apply to a public official who is potentially 
personally liable in the matter in question.”152 
C. Other Communications “Authorized by Law” 
As noted, Comment 5 to Model Rule 4.2 offers two illustrations of 
communications that may be authorized by law: those in connection with 
“certain investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental 
entities” and those “by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a 
constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the 
 
 150. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(a)(4). 
 151. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 11. 
 152. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 11; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 408 n.2 (1997). 
  
March 2009] TOWARD A REVISED 4.2 NO-CONTACT RULE 823 
government.”153 Other authorities have recognized additional 
communications that may be “authorized by law” and therefore 
permissible under the no-contact rule.154 For example, the Restatement 
(Third) interprets the exception as allowing a lawyer “to assist a client in 
complying with a legal right or responsibility to communicate directly 
with a represented person.”155 Under this approach, a lawyer would be 
permitted to cause a summons, complaint, or subpoena to be delivered to 
a represented person, to make a formal demand on a represented person 
as a prerequisite to filing suit, or to deliver notice to a represented person 
under a private contractual provision.156 The Restatement (Third) notes 
that in all of these situations, requiring a communication to be delivered 
through the represented person’s lawyer could give rise to disputes over 
the effectiveness of delivery.157 Some states include similar provisions in 
the text of their rules. Florida’s rule permits communication “in order to 
meet the requirements of any court rule, statute or contract requiring 
notice or service of process directly on the adverse party,”158 and 
Oregon’s rule permits communication if “a written agreement requires a 
written notice or demand be sent to such other person.”159 Both states’ 
rules require that in such circumstances, a copy be sent to the adverse 
party’s lawyer. 
Some authorities have suggested that undercover communications 
made at the direction of a lawyer to test for illegal practices (“testing”) 
should also be considered authorized by law and therefore permissible.160 
 
 153. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (2008). 
 154. See, e.g., Smith v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ind. 1999) (permitting communication 
where rule provided for service of complaint); Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar R. 4-4.2 (2008) 
(permitting communication “in order to meet the requirements of any ‘court rule,’ statute or contract 
requiring notice or service or process directly on the adverse party”); Or. Code of Prof’l 
Responsibility DR 7-104(A)(1)(c) (2003) (permitting communication if “a written agreement requires 
a written notice or demand be sent to such other person”); Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. g (2000); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 92-362 (1992); Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.4 (noting “many situations in which 
clients must or may communicate directly with each other”); see also Ariz. State Bar Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct Comm., Op. 2003-02 (2003) (permitting communication where bankruptcy rules required 
certain notices be sent directly to parties); Contractual Notice Isn’t ‘Communication’ That Must Go 
Through Adversary’s Counsel, 19 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Current Rep. (ABA/BNA) 456, 456 
(2003) (permitting communication as provided under private contract). 
 155. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. g. Comment 4 to the 
Model Rule may intend to incorporate this approach. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 
cmt. 4 (“Also, a lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with 
a represented person is permitted to do so.”). 
 156. Hazard, Jr. & Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.4. 
 157. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. g; Hazard, Jr. & 
Hodes, supra note 55, § 38.4. 
 158. Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar R. 4-4.2(a).  
 159. Or. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 4.2(c) (2006). 
 160. See generally, e.g., Julian J. Moore, Home Sweet Home: Examining the (Mis)Application of the 
Anti-Contact Rule to Housing Discrimination Testers, 25 J. Legal Prof. 75 (2001). 
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A tester poses as an applicant to gather evidence of employment, 
housing, or public accommodations discrimination.161 For example, 
testers of different races might express interest in purchasing an 
apartment to determine whether a prospective seller selects one 
applicant over the other on the basis of race. Testing can be used to 
detect other types of illegal activity as well, such as unfair competition 
practices.162 Notwithstanding testers’ misrepresentation of their identity 
and purpose, courts have upheld the legality of their practices and the 
admissibility of their evidence.163 Courts have also concluded that lawyer 
direction and involvement in the process is authorized by law and 
therefore permissible under the no-contact rule.164 These courts recognize 
that while legitimating deception is disagreeable, it may sometimes be 
necessary. They also recognize that testing practices do not threaten the 
interests that the no-contact rule seeks to protect.165 Testers pose as 
consumers to gather information that is available to the general public; 
they do not interfere with the attorney-client relationship.166 
We think Model Rule 4.2 should explicitly recognize that both of 
these categories of communications—communications in connection with 
a legal right or responsibility, and testing communications—may be 
authorized by law and therefore permissible. Accordingly, we propose 
adding language to new subsection (c), explaining that: 
  (c) A communication is authorized by law when it is in connection 
with: 
 . . . . 
 (2) transmittal of legally required or permitted notice, such as 
service of process; [or] 
 (3) an investigative procedure permitted by public policy, 
 
 161. For a discussion of testing in various contexts, see David B. Isbell and Lucantonio N. Salvi, 
Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination 
Testers, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 791, 793 (1995). 
 162. See Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imps., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Apple 
Corps. v. Int’l Collectors Soc’y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 163. See Isbell & Salvi, supra note 161, at 799 nn.23–25 (listing cases in which courts upheld the use 
of testing in employment, housing, and other contexts). 
 164. See Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 
120. But see In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (upholding ban of all undercover operations involving 
lawyers). 
 165. See Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321–22 (7th Cir. 1983) (observing that the evidence 
provided by testers is frequently indispensable and that the requirement of deception is a relatively 
small price to pay to defeat racial discrimination); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908, 909–10 n.1 (10th 
Cir. 1973) (“It would be difficult indeed to prove discrimination in housing without [the tester’s] 
means of gathering evidence.”); see also Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 475. 
 166. As one court explained in the context of testing for trademark infringement, “[t]he use of 
investigators, posing as consumers and speaking to nominal parties who are not involved in any aspect 
of the litigation, does not constitute an end-run around the attorney/client privilege.” Gidatex, 82 F. 
Supp. 2d at 126. 
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notwithstanding that it involves an element of deception, such as 
by discrimination testers.167 
New subparagraph (c)(2) follows the lead of the Restatement (Third) 
in acknowledging that law and private agreement may not only allow, but 
may actively require, direct communication with a represented person. 
The no-contact rule should respect this and allow lawyers to assist parties 
in exercising any such right or complying with any such responsibility. 
For example, a lawyer should be able to assist a client to comply with a 
responsibility to deliver notice directly to a represented person. 
New subparagraph (c)(3) recognizes that in certain situations, 
deception by a lawyer or a lawyer’s agent is desirable on public policy 
grounds. As noted in the proposed text, the most prominent example of a 
communication that will be permitted under this exception is a 
communication made in connection with testing.168 These 
communications, authorized by case law, pose no threat to the client-
lawyer relationship. Rather, they serve the important public policy of 
detecting illegal practices. 
D. Waiver 
A represented person’s lawyer, but not a represented person 
himself, can waive the protections of Model Rule 4.2.169 If represented 
persons have the authority to waive the protections of other ethical 
rules,170 the question arises why the same is not true with respect to the 
no-contact rule. The answer lies in the logic of the no-contact rule, which 
is premised on the notion that a layperson is fatally vulnerable to an 
opposing lawyer’s importunities.171 
Accordingly, the rule’s protections cannot be waived by a client, 
even if the client is sophisticated,172 and even if the client has good reason 
for wanting to communicate with another lawyer involved in a matter.173 
One can envision many such situations. A high-level whistleblower might 
want to contact a government lawyer to offer information about the 
corporate target of a government investigation. A spouse in a domestic 
relations matter might be dissatisfied with counsel and interested in other 
or joint representation. A criminal co-defendant, mistrustful of counsel, 
 
 167. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(c)(2)–(3). 
 168. See Moore, supra note 160. 
 169. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 (2008); Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 99(1)(e) (1998). 
 170. Most notably, this is the case with certain conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Model Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7(b)(4). 
 171. See In re Waldron, 790 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Mo. 1990) (en banc). 
 172. See, e.g., Estate of Vafiades v. Sheppard Bus Serv., Inc., 469 A.2d 971, 978 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1983); In re Illuzzi, 616 A.2d 233, 236 (Vt. 1992). 
 173. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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might want to initiate a conversation with the prosecutor regarding 
possible cooperation. 
The Model Rule, the Restatement (Third), and case law prohibit 
communication in all these situations. Comment 3 to the Model Rule 
explains that “[t]he Rule applies even though the represented person 
initiates or consents to the communication.”174 The Comment then 
instructs a lawyer who is contacted by a represented person to 
immediately terminate the communication.175 The Restatement (Third)’s 
comments definitively state that the general exception for consent 
“requires consent of the opposing lawyer; consent of the client alone 
does not suffice.”176 
The majority of courts and bar associations hold similarly.177 In 
United States v. Chavez, a defendant wanted to cooperate with the 
government and believed that his lawyer was not acting in his best 
interests.178 The defendant repeatedly contacted an FBI agent who told 
the defendant he needed to inform an attorney or the court if he wanted 
to speak with the government.179 The Fourth Circuit suggested that in the 
course of these conversations, the agent, acting under a lawyer’s 
supervision, had violated the Rule.180 The proper course of action, the 
court explained, would have been to terminate the conversation 
immediately.181 
By placing complete control of communications in the lawyer’s 
hands, this approach presumes the role of the traditional, faithful lawyer. 
But fulfillment of this role is contradicted by the very initiative the client 
is undertaking—contacting another lawyer after deciding a retained 
lawyer is not serving the client’s best interests. The lawyer in such a case 
may well “understand” the situation better than the client, but that could 
 
 174. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2008). This comment “makes clear that the 
protections accorded by Rule 4.2 may not be waived by the client.” Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct 
Reference Man. (ABA/BNA) 71:309 (Oct. 29, 2008) (quoting ABA Report to the House of 
Delegates, No. 401, Model Rule 4.2, Reporter’s Observations ¶ 5 (2002)).  
 175. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 3; see also Restatement (Third) of the Law 
Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. f (2000). 
 176. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b; see also id. cmt. j. 
 177. See, e.g., Monceret v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 29 S.W.3d 455, 461 (Tenn. 2000); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995); see also ABA Comm. on Prof’l 
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l 
and Judicial Ethics, Op. No. 80-46, at 14 (1980). 
 178. 902 F.2d 259, 262 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 266. 
 181. Id.; see also In re Chan, 271 F. Supp. 2d 539, 543–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See generally Brenna K. 
DeVaney, The “No-Contact” Rule: Helping or Hurting Criminal Defendants in Plea Negotiations?, 14 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 933, 933 (2001). 
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be the essence of the client’s quandary, as the lawyer could be exploiting 
the situation to his own advantage, rather than serving the client.182 
Concluding that a client cannot make a reasonably reliable estimate 
of two lawyers’ relative trustworthiness (the client’s and the adversary’s) 
is, as commentators have noted, paternalistic.183 It deprives the client of 
meaningful choice and, in some representations, of effective 
representation. Accordingly, some commentators propose an approach 
that would permit client waiver and subsequent direct contact as long as 
the represented person’s lawyer is given notice. Even this could be 
problematic however, as illustrated by the defendant who is a low-level 
participant in a criminal conspiracy, in which the principals hired the 
defense lawyer. The defendant would be ill-advised to waive the rule’s 
protections and talk to the prosecutor if the defense lawyer would be 
informed of the contact. The prototypical example is the “mule” carrier 
of drugs whose lawyer has been provided by higher-ups in the drug ring 
and who would put himself at great danger if knowledge that he 
cooperated with the prosecutor passed back through the defense lawyer 
to those who retained the lawyer.184 
In the more prosaic context of civil matters, John Leubsdorf 
describes how the lack of a client waiver provision offers unwarranted 
protection of lawyers’ interests: 
If the lawyer is paid by the hour, he will profit if all communications go 
through him. In addition, direct communication with opposing counsel 
may reveal to a client that his lawyer is lazy or uninformed, or that the 
client’s prospects of success differ from what his lawyer has led him to 
believe. These possibilities may well bias the lawyer against consenting 
to direct communications with his client.185 
Leubsdorf suggests that the primary way in which the rule elevates 
lawyers’ interests above clients’ is by enabling a lawyer to prolong a case 
by withholding a settlement offer.186 Doing so would constitute a 
violation of other ethical duties,187 but bar associations and courts have 
held that it does not justify direct contact with a represented person.188 It 
is difficult to defend such a prohibition, particularly if the communication 
 
 182. See Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1049 (1984); Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-
Client Dialogue, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1003, 1003–04 (1980). 
 183. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. b; Marcy 
Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 
N.C. L. Rev. 315, 321 (1987). 
 184. See Saylor IV & Wilson, supra note 55, at 459–60. 
 185. Leubsdorf, supra note 37, at 689–90. 
 186. Id. at 690. 
 187. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2008). 
 188. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. f; see also ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1348 (1975). 
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is initiated by the represented person or if a copy is sent to the 
represented person’s lawyer. 
Some commentators would specially exempt corporate 
whistleblowers from the rule’s prohibition, so as to encourage their 
actions.189 The Ninth Circuit followed this approach where an employee 
of a corporate defendant approached the government lawyer to report 
she was being pressured to testify falsely. The court noted that “it would 
be a perversion of the rule against ex parte contacts to extend it to 
protect corporate officers who would suborn perjury by their 
employees.”190 Other commentators would exempt communications by 
criminal defendants who initiate contact with a prosecutor,191 since 
prosecutors have special professional obligations that would serve as a 
safeguard to the defendant’s legal rights.192 Still others would exempt 
communications by any litigant in a civil or criminal law enforcement 
proceeding who initiates contact with a government lawyer.193 If any or 
all of these proposals are appropriate and desirable, it is difficult to 
justify the absence of a general exception for client-initiated contact. 
Stated otherwise, if the argument for client autonomy is persuasive in 
some contexts, why is it not persuasive in all contexts? 
Finding no convincing answer to this question, and notwithstanding 
the majority interpretation to the contrary, we would add a general 
exception to Model Rule 4.2 for client waiver. But we would qualify it 
with the safeguard that the lawyer must memorialize in writing the 
client’s initiation of the communication. Accordingly, we propose 
specifying in new paragraph (a) that the Rule’s prohibition does not 
apply where “the represented person initiates the communication, a fact 
that is confirmed in writing.”194 
Allowing clients to waive the Rule’s protections by initiating 
communication is desirable for a number of reasons. It serves client 
autonomy. It allows informal contacts where a represented person wants 
to cooperate with the adversary, and thereby facilitates fact-finding, 
truth-seeking, and dispute resolution. And it limits the extent to which 
lawyers can use the Rule to serve their own interests at the expense of 
their clients’. 
E. Emergencies 
Neither Model Rule 4.2 nor typical state formulations of the no-
contact rule includes an exception for emergency situations—situations 
 
 189. See Pierce, Part III, supra note 95, at 645–46. 
 190. United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 191. See Pierce, Part III, supra note 95, at 645–46. 
 192. See Uviller, supra note 127. 
 193. See Pierce, Part III, supra note 95, at 645–46. 
 194. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(a)(5). 
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where direct communications could protect against imminent harm. 
Ethical rules addressing attorney-client confidentiality, in contrast, 
acknowledge the overriding importance of certain interests in emergency 
situations.195 The Comment to Model Rule 1.6, for example, explains that 
the duty of confidentiality recognizes, in limited situations “the 
overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure 
reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial 
bodily harm.”196 And the prevailing exceptions to Rule 1.6 allow the 
lawyer to interdict financial harm where the lawyer’s assistance was 
involved.197 
One can envision several situations in which a lawyer might want to 
contact a represented person directly in order to avert imminent harm. A 
lawyer might want to warn a represented person that the lawyer’s client 
is likely to engage in violent acts. Or a lawyer might want to 
communicate directly with a represented spouse or partner regarding a 
child’s whereabouts or health emergency. Recognizing such exigencies, 
the Restatement (Third) includes an exception “to protect life or personal 
safety and to deal with other emergency situations . . . to the extent 
reasonably necessary to deal with the emergency.”198 Model Rule 4.2 has 
no such express qualification. Rather, it addresses the issue in Comment 
6, which states that an emergency may justify a court order authorizing 
communication.199 Obtaining such an order may of course be appropriate 
in some situations, but it is insufficient for addressing an immediate risk 
of harm. 
One would like to think that a conscientious lawyer’s response to 
serious emergency would deflect complaint or disciplinary grievance and 
that an exception is therefore unnecessary. But the very existence of a 
rule that prohibits emergency communications may have a chilling effect. 
An express exception should therefore be made. We propose that new 
paragraph (a) of the Rule specify that the general prohibition does not 
apply where “the communication is necessary in light of what the lawyer 
reasonably believes to be an emergency.”200 
In a comment, we propose to elaborate on this exception as follows: 
  Communications necessary in light of what the lawyer reasonably 
believes to be an emergency include communications that the lawyer 
believes necessary to address an imminent and reasonably certain risk 
of death, substantial bodily harm or compromised personal safety. 
 
 195. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 (2008). 
 196. Id. cmt. 6. 
 197. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b). 
 198. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. i (2000); see also id. 
§ 99(1)(d). 
 199. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 6. 
 200. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(a)(3). 
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They may also include communications that the lawyer believes 
necessary to address an imminent risk of harm to the financial interests 
or property of another, in furtherance of which the lawyer’s client used 
the lawyer’s services. See Rule 1.6. Where the risk of harm is not 
imminent, a lawyer should seek a court order prior to engaging in the 
communication.201 
To the end of establishing ethical rules that reflect the fundamental 
values of our justice system, this exception would acknowledge that when 
in imminent danger, a person’s life and safety outweigh protection of the 
client-lawyer relationship. So too does the legal system’s interest in 
allowing lawyers to prevent or rectify substantial financial harm created 
with their unknowing assistance. This exception would also align Rule 
4.2’s exceptions with Rule 1.6’s, creating consistent and mutually 
reinforcing ethical standards. 
F. Lawyer Who Is a Party to a Matter 
Model Rule 4.2 applies when a lawyer is “representing a client.”202 It 
does not specify whether it applies to a lawyer who is acting pro se, such 
as a lawyer communicating directly with his landlord in a dispute over a 
lease or a lawyer communicating directly with a spouse in a divorce 
proceeding.203 In these and similar situations, lawyers have legitimate 
interests in being treated like any other party to a matter. Opposing 
parties, meanwhile, have legitimate interests in the Rule’s protections. 
There is little consensus about the proper approach to these 
situations. Model Rule 4.2 is silent on the issue, while the Restatement 
(Third) includes an exception for a “lawyer [who] is a party [to the 
matter] and [who] represents no other client in the matter.”204 State 
courts and ethics committees have split on the issue, some holding that 
the Rule does not apply in such situations,205 some holding that it does,206 
and some adopting an intermediate approach. Minnesota, for example, 
provides that “a party who is a lawyer may communicate directly with 
another party unless expressly instructed to avoid communication by the 
 
 201. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 10. 
 202. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2. 
 203. See generally Stephen J. Langs, Note, Legal Ethics—The Question of Ex Parte 
Communications and Pro Se Lawyers Under Model Rule 4.2—Hey, Can We Talk?, 19 W. New Eng. 
L. Rev. 421, 423 (1997); Pierce, Part III, supra note 95. 
 204. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99(1)(b) (2000); id. § 99 cmt. e. 
 205. See, e.g., Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 578 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Conn. 1990); Cal. 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2-100 annots. (2008) (“[T]he rule does not prohibit a member who is 
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represented party.”); Bar Ass’n of N.Y. City, Op. No. 81-8 (1981). 
 206. See, e.g., Runsvold v. State Bar, 925 P.2d 1118, 1119–20 (Idaho 1996); In re Segall, 509 N.E.2d 
988, 990, (Ill. 1987); In re Shaefer, 25 P.3d 191, 199–202 (Nev. 2001); In re Smith, 861 P.2d 1013, 1016–
17 (Or. 1993); Vickery v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 259–60 (Tex. App. 1999); In re 
Haley, 126 P.3d 1262, 1269, 1275 (Wash. 2006); Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Simmons, 399 S.E.2d 894, 
897 (W. Va. 1990); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 108–09 (Wyo. 1994). 
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other lawyer[], or unless the other party manifests a desire to 
communicate only through counsel.”207 One court has explained that 
when proceeding pro se, “[t]he lawyer still has an advantage over the 
average layperson, and the integrity of the relationship between the 
represented person and counsel is not entitled to less protection merely 
because the lawyer is appearing pro se.”208 We agree. A lawyer poses the 
same threat to the adverse party whether representing a client, 
proceeding pro se, or being represented by another lawyer. In all cases, 
the lawyer can use her training in the law to influence or even intimidate 
the adverse party and to interfere with the adversary’s client-lawyer 
relationship. We therefore propose changing the text of the Rule from 
“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not . . . .” to “A lawyer 
participating in a matter shall not . . . .”209 We also propose a comment 
that states: “This Rule applies to a lawyer who is a party to a proceeding 
in the same manner as it does to a lawyer representing a client.”210 
Potential concerns about limiting a lawyer’s routine interactions—
for example, communications with a landlord regarding repairs to an 
apartment—are unwarranted. Courts, bar associations and 
commentators agree that the Rule applies only when a person is 
represented in a particular matter. Accordingly, a global claim of 
representation in all matters by a lawyer on retainer is insufficient to 
trigger the Rule’s protection.211 
G. Organizational Representation 
Proper application of the no-contact rule to a represented 
organization has been the source of much confusion and debate. The 
difficulty stems from an organization’s status as an artificial legal entity 
that acts only through its constituents. If the no-contact rule is to afford 
protection to organizations, some constituents must qualify as 
“represented persons” with whom communication is barred.212 But if 
every constituent is a represented person, the rule will not only offer 
organizations far greater protection than it offers individuals, it will 
impede public law enforcement and private lawsuits. 
The basic issue—determining who personifies the “represented 
person”—can arise in any dispute involving a represented organization, 
be it a corporation, partnership, proprietorship, or any other legal entity. 
 
 207. Minn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 (2007). 
 208. In re Schaefer, 25 P.3d at 199. 
 209. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(a). 
 210. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 5. 
 211. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. c (2000); ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396, at 13–15 (1995). 
 212. Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (N.Y. 1990); see also Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate 
and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 279, 279–85 
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For example, when the government investigates a corporation, agency 
lawyers may want to interview employees informally about possible civil 
or criminal violations. The corporation, which will most likely have in-
house and/or outside counsel, will claim that these employees constitute 
represented persons and that the interviews are therefore impermissible. 
The rule’s task is to draw an appropriate line between those constituents 
who can be contacted and those who cannot. Some corporate counsel 
have attempted to claim that they always represent all corporate 
employees, but courts have rejected such claims.213 
Similar disputes arise in the course of private-party disputes. For 
example, a lawyer may want to informally contact witness-employees in a 
personal injury action against an employer. If there are no nonemployee 
witnesses, informal interviews may be a necessary means of 
substantiating the claim before filing suit. The defendant corporation, 
however, may contend that the employees are represented persons and 
that contact is impermissible. Again, the task is to draw an appropriate 
line between those employees who can be contacted and those who 
cannot. 
The rule should offer corporations the same protection offered to 
individuals—protection of the client-lawyer relationship, including the 
attorney-client privilege. Corporations and corporate counsel contend 
that to do so, the rule must prohibit contact with a broad scope of 
corporate constituents.214 But organizational clients are generally more 
sophisticated than individual clients and less susceptible to overreaching 
by opposing counsel. These considerations weigh in favor of a narrower 
scope of covered constituents.215 Also weighing in favor of a narrow scope 
is the heightened importance of informal fact-finding in an 
organizational context. Informal interviews with employees may be the 
only means for a party opposing a represented person to obtain key facts 
and information.216 Much information will be in the “exclusive control” of 
the organization and its employees, and may not be produced through 
formal discovery.217 Moreover, employees who would have offered 
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prejudicial information in an informal private environment may be 
hesitant to do so in front of the corporation’s lawyer for fear of 
retaliation. Accordingly, as the New York Court of Appeals explained, 
“[t]he broader the definition of ‘party’ in the interests of fairness to the 
corporation, the greater the cost in terms of foreclosing vital informal 
access to facts.”218 
Moreover, limiting informal discovery imposes additional burdens in 
the organizational context. By increasing the costs of litigation through 
formal discovery, it may preclude the possibility of suit for individual 
plaintiffs who often have comparatively fewer resources.219 And by 
precluding individual plaintiffs’ access to vital sources of information, it 
may discourage lawsuits, frustrating private litigation’s role as an 
“important means of controlling abuses of corporate power and 
restraining abuses of law.”220 
The interests of the organization’s constituents further complicate 
the issue. An employee’s interests may well diverge from those of the 
organization. For example, an employee may determine that it is in his 
best interest to cooperate with a government lawyer investigating 
possible corporate wrongdoing. If the employee qualifies as a 
represented person, he will not be able to contact the government lawyer 
without the consent of the corporation’s lawyer.221 Nor will he have the 
escape valve of firing his lawyer—an option, albeit it extreme, that 
represented individuals can make use of if their lawyers unreasonably 
withhold consent. In the end, neither the employee’s interest in 
cooperating, nor the legal system’s interest in addressing corporate 
wrongdoing, will be served. 
Prior to the 1995 amendments, the Model Rule did not offer 
guidance as to how to balance these interests and determine the proper 
scope of the Rule in the organizational context. The text of the Model 
Rule still does not do so, but Comment 7 identifies three classes of an 
organization’s constituents with whom direct contact is prohibited: 
  In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits 
communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, 
directs or regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning 
 
 218. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1033; see also Bouge v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 565 (D. 
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the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to 
the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may 
be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal 
liability.222 
The first category of constituents, which is also incorporated in the 
Restatement (Third)’s version,223 covers those individuals who regularly 
interact with the corporation’s lawyer and are therefore likely to be privy 
to privileged and confidential information.224 The second category, which 
may substantially overlap with the first, covers those individuals who can 
commit the organization to settlement and other major decisions with 
respect to the matter. Both of these categories can be difficult to apply, 
particularly for an outside lawyer who will not know at the time of an 
interview whether a constituent has the authority to obligate the 
organization.225 
The third category of constituents, also included in the Restatement 
(Third)’s formulation,226 includes those whose actions may be imputed to 
the organization for purposes of liability. This category appropriately 
includes individuals who have “acted in the matter on behalf of the 
organization, and save for the separate legal character of the 
organizational form, would often be directly named as a party in a 
lawsuit involving the matter.”227 In the out-of-court context, this category 
may be as difficult to apply as the first two. A lawyer may not know the 
legal theory of the case at the time of the interview, making it impossible 
to determine whose conduct might be imputed to the organization for 
purposes of liability.228 A further shortcoming of this category is its 
potentially great breadth, since “things that are wholly innocent, such as 
record keeping, may be imputed to the organization in order to establish 
its liability for the conduct of other employees.”229 
The pre-2002 version of the Model Rule extended protection to 
employees whose statements could “constitute an admission on the part 
of the organization.”230 This standard was ambiguous because of 
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uncertainty in the evidentiary rule to which it referred. It was likely 
intended to refer to evidentiary rules of some jurisdictions that provided 
that statements by certain employees were admissible against the 
organization and could not be controverted, i.e., were “binding.”231 Many 
courts, however, read it as referencing the party admission exception to 
the hearsay rules.232 The common law hearsay rule provides that an 
employee’s statement, although not “binding” on the employer, is 
admissible against an employer to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
“if the agent was authorized to make the statement or was authorized to 
make, on the principal’s behalf, any statements concerning the subject 
matter.”233 The federal evidentiary rule and those in many states 
liberalized this common law test, allowing the admission of a statement 
by an employee if it involved a matter within the scope of employment.234 
Depending on a jurisdiction’s rules of evidence, this provision can 
therefore create an extremely broad prohibition on informal 
communications.235 The Model Rule now rejects this approach.236 The 
Restatement (Third), meanwhile, adopts the “binding admission” version, 
phrasing the rule as prohibiting communication “if a statement of the 
employee or other agent, under applicable rules of evidence, would have 
the effect of binding the organization with respect to proof of the 
matter.”237 The Restatement (Third)’s comment explains this standard is 
designed to preclude communications by constituents who have the 
power to make statements the principal cannot thereafter contradict, but 
not communications with individuals solely because their statements are 
admissible under the hearsay rule.238 
Neither the Model Rule’s nor the Restatement (Third)’s approach 
have been uniformly adopted by states. In fact, state standards vary 
significantly. Some states continue to follow approaches developed prior 
to the Model Rule and the Restatement (Third), while others have 
 
organization’s lawyer was required for communication with a person “whose statement may constitute 
an admission on the part of the organization”), with Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 
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 231. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100(2)(b) cmt. e. 
 232. See, e.g., Weibrecht v. S. Ill. Transfer Inc., 241 F.3d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 2001); Paulson v. 
Plainfield Trucking, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 654, 656 (D. Minn. 2002); Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. v. Arctic 
Cat Sales, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1155–57 (D.S.D. 2001); Brown v. St. Joseph County, 148 F.R.D. 
246, 254 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Cole v. Appalachian Power Co., 903 F. Supp. 975, 976 (S.D. W. Va. 1995). 
 233. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 286 (1958). 
 234. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) (employee’s statement constitutes an admission if it is 
“concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the 
relationship”). 
 235. Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. Pres. & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 764 N.E.2d 825, 833 
(Mass. 2002) (noting test would “effectively prohibit the questioning of all employees who can offer 
information helpful to the litigation”). 
 236. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008) 
 237. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100(2)(c) (2000). 
 238. Id. § 100(2) cmt. e. 
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rejected the Model Rule and Restatement (Third) and developed 
different standards. All formulations have shortcomings. At one end of 
the spectrum of state approaches is the “control group” test, which 
prohibits communications only with “those top management persons 
who had the responsibility of making final decisions and those employees 
whose advisory roles to top management are such that a decision would 
not normally be made without those persons’ advice or opinion or whose 
opinions in fact form the basis of any final decision.”239 Correlatively, 
informal contacts and interviews are permissible with all employees who 
are not part of upper level management. This test has been heavily 
criticized for providing corporations with insufficient protection240 and for 
lacking predictability.241 Prior to an interview, it will often be difficult for 
opposing counsel to determine which employees fall within a 
corporation’s control group.242 
At the opposite end of the spectrum of state approaches is a blanket 
rule that bans communication with all corporate employees.243 This test 
provides certainty and absolute protection to the corporation, but at the 
expense of all informal fact-finding and resulting access to information.244 
Virtually all authorities now reject this approach.245 
Some courts have concluded that it is impossible to formulate a test 
to differentiate between employees who can and cannot be contacted.246 
In Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corporation, a district court 
balanced a variety of factors, including the corporation’s interest in 
protecting itself and the opposing parties’ interest in discovering the facts 
of the case.247 This approach, which the court labeled a case-by-case 
balancing test, provides flexibility to be sure. But “flexibility” is a soft 
word for “ambiguity,” and it remains uncertain which corporate 
constituents can be contacted. 
 
 239. Fair Auto. Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Serv. Sys., Inc., 471 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ill. 1984); see also B.H. 
ex rel. Monahan v. Johnson, 128 F.R.D. 659, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 240. Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032–35 (N.Y. 1990); Hume, supra note 27, at 980–81; 
Lidge III, supra note 225, at 815; Saltzburg, supra note 212; Sinaiko, supra note 27, at 1483.  
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 243. See, e.g., Tucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 849 F. Supp. 1096, 1099–101 (E.D. Va. 1994); 
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Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv., Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 1037, 1042 (D.N.J. 1990). 
 244. Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1039; Miller & Calfo, supra note 214, at 1072. 
 245. See Niesig, 558 N.E.2d at 1039; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 100(2) cmt. b (2000); Hume, supra note 27, at 973. 
 246. See, e.g., Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 15 (D. Mass. 1989); Mompoint v. Lotus 
Dev. Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414, 418 (D. Mass 1986). 
 247. Mompoint, 110 F.R.D. at 418. 
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A standard that has gained much support is the “managing-speaking 
agent” test. This test defines the constituents who cannot be contacted as 
those who are managers or who are authorized to speak on behalf of the 
corporation in the matter in question,248 and extends the rule’s coverage 
beyond the control group but not to lower level employees. In adopting 
this formulation, the Supreme Court of Washington explained that it 
“served both to protect represented parties from the dangers of dealing 
with adverse counsel and to preserve the accessibility of testimony of 
employee witnesses.”249 
Some variation of the managing-speaking agent test may be the best 
means of differentiating between employees who can and cannot be 
contacted.250 This test acknowledges and balances competing interests, 
while offering more predictable guidance than a case-by-case balancing 
approach. Like the other approaches, however, it has deficiencies. Some 
commentators contend that it fails to provide the corporation sufficient 
protection, since middle and lower level employees often have 
information that can be highly damaging,251 and statements of those 
whose acts or omissions gave rise to litigation, regardless of their 
position, might constitute evidentiary admissions against the corporation. 
Also, it may be difficult to apply, as it will often be difficult for a lawyer 
to determine prior to an interview whether a particular constituent is in a 
forbidden category.252 
Addressing some of these concerns is a test adopted by the New 
York Court of Appeals in Niesig v. Team I, which prohibits 
communication with those constituents whose acts or omissions in the 
matter are binding on the corporation, who are responsible for 
implementing the advice of counsel, or whose interests are directly at 
stake.253 All other employees may be interviewed informally.254 Another 
approach that addresses some of these concerns is that adopted by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, 
P.C. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College.255 The court set forth 
three categories of employees with whom a lawyer cannot communicate 
directly: those who exercise managerial responsibility with regard to the 
subject matter of the litigation, those who are alleged to have committed 
 
 248. See Wright ex rel. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984); see also 
Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assoc., Ltd., 59 P.3d 1237, 1247 (Nev. 2002). 
 249. Wright, 691 P.2d at 564. 
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 251. Sinaiko, supra note 27, at 1487. 
 252. Lidge III, supra note 225, at 830–31. 
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 255. 764 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 2002). 
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the wrongful acts at issue in the litigation, and those who have the 
authority to make decisions about the course of the litigation.256 The 
approaches of both Niesig and Fellows of Harvard College recognize 
Rule 4.2’s role in protecting the client-lawyer relationship by focusing 
attention on the employee’s relationship with the organization’s lawyer. 
They also offer the corporation somewhat more protection than the 
“managing-speaking agent” test by extending coverage to employees 
who have no power to bind the organization and no direct role in the 
client-lawyer relationship, but who nevertheless could severely impair 
the effectiveness of representation through conversations with opposing 
counsel. 
The revisions to the Model Rule in 1995 to address these issues in a 
comment, and in 2002 to eliminate the reference to admissions, were 
positive steps. However, the text itself should address the issue. We 
believe it should do so in a manner that adopts the strengths of the Niesig 
and Fellows of Harvard College approaches. Accordingly, we propose to 
add the following paragraph to the text of Model Rule 4.2: 
  (d) Where an organization is represented by a lawyer in a matter, 
this Rule applies to communication with a current constituent of the 
organization: 
 (1) who supervises or directs the organization’s lawyer; 
 (2) who substantially participates in, or has authority to obligate 
the organization with respect to, the representation; or 
 (3) whose acts or omissions materially contributed to the matter 
underlying the representation.257 
In articulating this standard, we are mindful that the Rule’s proper 
function is not to protect the organization against disclosure of harmful 
but nonprivileged information.258 Rather, it is to protect the client-lawyer 
relationship and the attorney-client privilege that is at the core of that 
relationship.259 Accordingly, the first two proposed prongs focus on 
constituents who will have regular and substantial interaction with the 
organization’s lawyer and who embody the organization in dealing with 
the lawyer—those who supervise or direct the lawyer, and those who 
substantially participate in the representation or have the authority to 
obligate the organization in the representation. 
Leaving the Rule’s coverage at those constituents who regularly 
interact with the organization’s lawyer would exclude a set of 
constituents covered by some current formulations of the Rule—those 
 
 256. Id. at 833. 
 257. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(d). 
 258. See Wright ex rel. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984) (“It is not 
the purpose of the rule to protect a corporate party from the revelation of prejudicial facts.”). 
 259. Id. 
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who played a role in the matter underlying the representation. Initially, 
this exclusion seems consistent with the Rule’s purpose of protecting the 
client-lawyer relationship. That the constituent’s conduct provided the 
basis for the legal matter does not, by itself, mean that communication 
with that person will threaten the organization’s client-lawyer 
relationship. But the difficulties of organizational representation—of the 
entity as an artificial construct—and the goal of approximating the 
protection offered by the Rule to individuals necessitate including 
individuals who were directly involved in the underlying matter. These 
constituents may not regularly interact with the lawyer, but they play a 
key role in the lawyer’s strategy and effective representation. Allowing 
informal communications with such individuals could allow opposing 
counsel to exert inappropriate influence, leading the individual to make 
damaging statements and to undermine the lawyer’s legal representation 
or strategy without the lawyer’s knowledge. 
As discussed, the Model Rule’s current standard includes these 
individuals within the Rule’s scope by including those constituents whose 
acts “may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal 
liability.”260 Also as discussed, this formulation is problematic because of 
the difficulty of determining whose conduct may be imputed for purposes 
of the applicable legal theory of liability. To signal that the test is not a 
precise legal inquiry, but rather asks a lawyer to exercise common sense 
in determining which individuals likely played a substantial role in the 
underlying matter, we use the language: “whose acts or omissions 
materially contributed to the matter underlying the representation.”261 
Crucial to the effectiveness of this inquiry will be clarifying the 
relevant knowledge standard.262 Neither the text nor the relevant 
comment specifies a knowledge standard, but the implication is that of 
“actual knowledge” that the person is represented in the matter.263 That 
standard may diminish the Rule’s protections, since it will rarely be the 
case that prior to an interview, a lawyer will have actual knowledge that a 
constituent has authority to obligate an organization or that a 
constituent’s conduct will be imputed to the organization for purposes of 
liability. One means of addressing this problem is to impose a duty to 
inquire about an employee’s status within the organization before a 
 
 260. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008). 
 261. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2(d)(3). 
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lawyer may communicate with the employee directly. A California court, 
for example, has explained: 
[I]n cases where an attorney has reason to believe that an employee of 
a represented organization might be covered by [the no-contact rule], 
that attorney would be well advised to either conduct discovery or 
communicate with opposing counsel concerning the employee’s status 
before contacting the employee. A failure to do so may, along with 
other facts, constitute circumstantial evidence that an attorney had 
actual knowledge . . . .264 
Another means of addressing the problem is to relax the actual 
knowledge standard for determining covered constituents. New Jersey’s 
rule, for example, prohibits communication with anyone the lawyer 
“knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter.”265 The rule further 
specifies that “[r]easonable diligence shall include, but not be limited to, 
a specific inquiry of the person as to whether that person is represented 
by counsel.”266 Following this approach, we propose to clarify the 
knowledge standard in the relevant comment as follows: 
In the context of organizational representation, the prohibition on 
communications applies where the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that a constituent is in a position within the organization to be 
classified as a represented person. This means that the lawyer has 
actual knowledge of the constituent’s position or that a lawyer of 
reasonable prudence and competence would have actual knowledge in 
the same circumstances. See Rule 1.0(j).267 
The discussion thus far has not distinguished between current and 
former employees. A few states have concluded that Rule 4.2’s 
prohibition applies to former employees,268 but the weight of authority 
holds that former employees are outside the scope of the Rule. The 
Model Rule,269 the Restatement (Third),270 and most courts271 permit 
 
 264. Snider v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 119, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 265. Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct Reference Man. (ABA/BNA) 71:302 (Oct. 29, 2008). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 13. 
 268. See, e.g., Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins. Serv., Ltd., 745 F. Supp. 
1037, 1039 (D.N.J. 1990); Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Md. Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D. Mass. 1987); 
Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont. 1986); Kan. Bar Ass’n, Formal Advisory 
Op. 92-07 (1991). 
 269. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2008) (amended in 2002 to specify that 
consent of an organization’s lawyer is not required for communications with former constituents). 
 270. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 100, cmt. g (2000). But see id. 
(noting that direct communication may not be appropriate in certain circumstances, such as if the 
former employee continues to consult with the entity’s attorney). 
 271. See, e.g., Valassis v. Samuelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Curley v. Cumberland 
Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 83 (D.N.J. 1991); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 
629 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); H.B.A. Mgmt. Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541, 544 (Fla. 1997); Humco, 
Inc. v. Noble, 31 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2000); Clark v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., 797 
N.E.2d 905, 908 (Mass. 2003); Muriel Siebert & Co. v. Intuit, Inc., 868 N.E.2d 208, 210–11 (N.Y. 2007); 
  
March 2009] TOWARD A REVISED 4.2 NO-CONTACT RULE 841 
communications with former employees. These authorities generally 
assert that once a constituent’s affiliation with an organization ceases, 
there is a greatly diminished risk that communications with that person 
will harm the organization’s client-lawyer relationship.272 This is only 
partially true, however. A former employee could make damaging 
statements that weaken the scope of the attorney-client privilege and 
undermine the lawyer’s strategy without the lawyer’s knowledge—for 
example, if a former employee is in regular contact with corporate 
counsel and holds confidential information, or if a former employee’s 
conduct is at the base of the dispute.273 Moreover, there is little principled 
reason, and little support in the language of Rule 4.2, for distinguishing 
between current and former employees whose conduct may be imputed 
to the organization for purposes of liability. Recognizing this, some 
courts have qualified or restricted communication with former 
employees in certain respects. Some courts allow direct communications, 
but with the reminder that the lawyer should not seek to acquire 
privileged information.274 Other courts prohibit communication if the 
former employee had been privy to confidential or privileged 
information,275 or if the former employee’s conduct could be imputed to 
the organization for purposes of liability.276 
We agree with the majority position that communications with 
former employees should generally be permissible. Once an employee 
ceases association with an organization, there is diminished risk of 
interference with the organization’s client-lawyer relationship. But we 
recognize that in certain situations, informal communications with 
former employees could threaten the policies underlying the Rule no less 
than communications with current employees. If Model Rule 4.2 is to 
approximate the protection it affords to an individual when it is applied 
to an organization, it should acknowledge this potential threat. 
Accordingly, we propose replacing the sentence in current Comment 7, 
explaining that communications with former employees are permitted, 
with the following: 
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In the case of a represented organization, consent of the organization’s 
lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent 
unless the former constituent is represented by the organization’s 
lawyer through an independent engagement or unless a lawyer knows 
or reasonably should know that the former constituent’s conduct 
materially contributed to the matter underlying the representation. In 
communicating with a former constituent, a lawyer shall not seek to 
elicit privileged or confidential information.277 
H. Class Actions 
A final context in which Rule 4.2’s proper application is unclear is 
class action lawsuits. The Model Rule does not mention class actions, but 
the Restatement (Third) summarizes the prevailing consensus that once a 
class has been certified, an opposing lawyer cannot contact a class 
member directly without the consent of class counsel.278 This is based on 
the notion that like any represented individual, a represented class 
member deserves the protection of the no-contact rule. The Restatement 
(Third) does not address the more difficult question of application of the 
rule after a class action has been filed but prior to certification.279 During 
such period, a lawyer for the “target” of the suit may want to contact 
putative class members to gather information, to try to initiate 
settlement, or to communicate on a related subject where the target and 
the class members have a continuing relationship such as employer-
employee. A lawyer for a competing putative class may want to contact 
putative class members to recruit them. 
Courts and commentators that have addressed 
postfiling/precertification scenarios have drawn divergent conclusions. 
Most argue that until a class is certified, application of the rule cannot be 
justified. Applying the rule would grant class counsel control over the 
communications of individuals who did not choose to be represented by 
class counsel, did not consent to membership in the class, and may not 
even know about the class.280 Others contend that a lawyer filing a class 
action has fiduciary duties to unnamed and even unknown putative 
 
 277. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 6. 
 278. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. l (2000); Hazard, Jr. & 
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 280. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99 cmt. l; Johnson, 
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members of the class, which form the basis of a quasi–client-lawyer 
relationship that should be protected by the rule.281 
Another difficult question is proper application of the rule after 
certification of a class but prior to expiration of the opt-out period. Some 
courts have allowed communications in these situations.282 Some 
commentators contend that allowing opposing counsel to contact 
putative class members during this period may benefit the putative class 
members, who have an interest in any information that will aid in their 
decision whether to opt out of the class. One commentator argues that 
the court’s certification of a class should be analogized to “a judicially 
approved offer from the lawyer to the class members to maintain the 
lawsuit on their behalf.”283 Accordingly, “given that the choice with 
respect to membership in the class is left to the class member until the 
expiration of the exclusion period, the right to control communication 
about the class action should be left to that individual class member.”284 
Others have suggested that communications should not be permitted 
during the opt-out period.285 They note the frequency of “abusive 
communications” by defense counsel, including “misrepresentations 
concerning the class action’s purpose, status, or effects, as well as threats 
or other forms of coercion.”286 
Model Rule 4.2, currently silent on these issues, should offer 
guidance. We propose to clarify that the Rule does not apply prior to 
certification or after certification but prior to expiration of an opt-out 
period. Prior to certification, putative class members should be in full 
control of their communications with both appointed class counsel and 
any other lawyers who are involved in the matter. We find the same 
reasoning persuasive with respect to the period after certification but 
prior to the expiration of an opt-out period. At such time, class members 
should be in full control of their communications. 
In order to implement these proposed applications of Rule 4.2 to 
class action lawsuits, we propose a comment that states: 
  Once a proceeding has been certified as a class action and any opt-
out period has expired, members of the class are considered 
represented persons for purposes of this Rule. Prior to that time, only 
those members of the class with whom the class’s lawyer maintains a 
personal client-lawyer relationship are considered represented 
persons.287 
 
 281. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 278, at 410. 
 282. See, e.g., St. Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-219 (1994). 
 283. Pierce, Part I, supra note 125, at 189. 
 284. Id. 
 285. See, e.g., Impervious Paint Ind., Inc., v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 724 (W.D. Ky. 1981). 
 286. Bassett, supra note 278, at 403–04. 
 287. See infra Appendix 2 R. 4.2 cmt. 7. 
  
844 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:797 
I. Guidance for Communications that Are Permitted 
Our proposed modifications will increase the number of direct 
communications that are permitted under Rule 4.2. Our final proposed 
change to the Rule’s text emphasizes that in the course of all permissible 
communications, a lawyer is prohibited from taking any action that will 
undermine the effectiveness of the represented person’s client-lawyer 
relationship, such as seeking information covered by the attorney-client 
privilege, causing the represented person to doubt a lawyer’s 
effectiveness, or negotiating a settlement with the represented person.288 
Already, Rule 4.4 requires attorneys to refrain from “using methods of 
obtaining evidence that violate the rights of third persons.”289 Case law 
has interpreted this provision as requiring attorneys engaging in ex parte 
communication to take precautions against disclosures of privileged 
information.290 In addition, we propose adding the following new 
paragraph to Model Rule 4.2’s text: 
  (b) A lawyer engaged in communication permitted by this Rule shall 
not seek or obtain information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege or work-product immunity, and shall comply with the 
standard of conduct set forth in Rule 4.3.291 
Model Rule 4.3, which addresses communications by unrepresented 
persons, requires a lawyer to identify her role in a matter and her client if 
doing so is necessary to avoid a misunderstanding.292 In a comment, we 
propose to clarify that this identification requirement will not apply in 
certain undercover investigatory activities, to ensure that this provision 
does not conflict with certain investigatory communications that are 
authorized by law and therefore permissible under the Rule.293 
Conclusion 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the dominant formulation 
of the no-contact rule, represented by Model Rule 4.2, is inadequate to 
address many situations that arise in modern legal practice. Some of 
these problems arise because the rule’s proper application is unclear; 
others because the rule’s application is undesirable. All of these 
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problems are rooted in the breadth of Model Rule 4.2’s prohibition and 
the open-ended terms of its exceptions. 
Just as other ethical rules have been modified and qualified to 
acknowledge and balance competing duties and interests, so too should 
the no-contact rule be reformed. In furtherance of this goal, this Article 
has proposed modifications to the text and comments of Model Rule 4.2, 
the full amended version of which can be found in Appendix 2. The 
proposed changes to the text: (1) clarify the meaning of the “authorized 
by law” exception, (2) articulate new exceptions to the Rule to avoid 
unjust applications, (3) revise the test for application of the Rule in the 
organizational context, and (4) offer guidelines for communications that 
occur under any of the Rule’s exceptions. The proposed changes to the 
comments clarify these modifications to the Rule’s text and, among other 
things, offer guidance as to the Rule’s application to lawyers who are 
parties to a matter and to class actions. Together, these changes aim to 
implement the no-contact rule’s proper purpose—protecting the client-
lawyer relationship to the greatest extent consistent with legitimate 
implicated interests—those of the client, the adversary, the court, and the 
legal system as a whole. 
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Appendix 1: ABA Model Rule 4.2 
Communication with Person Represented by Counsel 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the 
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be 
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court 
order. 
Comment 
 [1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal 
system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a 
lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who 
are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the 
client-lawyer relationship and the uncounseled disclosure of information 
relating to the representation. 
[2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is 
represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the 
communication relates. 
[3] The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or 
consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate 
communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the 
lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not 
permitted by this Rule. 
[4] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented 
person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters 
outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy 
between a government agency and a private party, or between two 
organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating 
with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. 
Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person 
who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a 
client in the matter. A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited 
by this Rule through the acts of another. See Rule 8.4(a). Parties to a 
matter may communicate directly with each other, and a lawyer is not 
prohibited from advising a client concerning a communication that the 
client is legally entitled to make. Also, a lawyer having independent 
justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented 
person is permitted to do so. 
[5] Communications authorized by law may include communications 
by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or 
other legal right to communicate with the government. Communications 
authorized by law may also include investigative activities of lawyers 
representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative 
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agents, prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement 
proceedings. When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, 
a government lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to honoring 
the constitutional rights of the accused. The fact that a communication 
does not violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to 
establish that the communication is permissible under this Rule. 
[6] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a 
represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may 
also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a 
communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for 
example, where communication with a person represented by counsel is 
necessary to avoid reasonably certain injury. 
[7] In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits 
communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, 
directs or regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning 
the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to 
the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may 
be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. 
Consent of the organization’s lawyer is not required for communication 
with a former constituent. If a constituent of the organization is 
represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that 
counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. 
Compare Rule 3.4(f). In communicating with a current or former 
constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use methods of 
obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the organization. See 
Rule 4.4. 
[8] The prohibition on communications with a represented person 
only applies in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is 
in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the 
lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such 
actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 
1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the 
consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious. 
[9] In the event the person with whom the lawyer communicates is 
not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer’s 
communications are subject to Rule 4.3. 
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Appendix 2: Proposed Rule 4.2 
Communication with Person Represented by Counsel 
(a) A lawyer participating in a matter shall not communicate about the 
matter with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless: 
 (1) the other lawyer consents to the communication; 
 (2) the communication is authorized by law or a court order; 
 (3) the communication is necessary in light of what the lawyer 
reasonably believes to be an emergency; 
 (4) the represented person is a public officer or agency and the 
communication is either consented to by the public officer or agency or is 
in writing with a copy sent to the other lawyer; or 
 (5) the represented person initiates the communication, a fact that is 
confirmed in writing. 
(b) A lawyer engaged in communication permitted by this Rule shall not 
seek or obtain information protected by the attorney-client privilege or 
work-product immunity, and shall comply with the standard of conduct 
in Rule 4.3. 
(c) A communication is authorized by law when it is inconnection with: 
 (1) a lawful investigation by or under authority of a public law 
enforcement or regulatory agency; 
 (2) transmittal of legally required or permitted notice, such as 
service of process; 
 (3) an investigative procedure permitted by public policy, 
notwithstanding that it involves an element of deception, such as by 
discrimination testers. 
(d) Where an organization is represented by a lawyer in a matter, this 
Rule applies to communication with a current constituent of the 
organization: 
 (1) who supervises or directs the organization’s lawyer; 
 (2) who substantially participates in, or has authority to obligate the 
organization with respect to, the representation; or 
 (3) whose acts or omissions materially contributed to the matter 
underlying the representation. 
Comment 
[1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal 
system by protecting the client-lawyer relationship against interference 
by other lawyers participating in the matter. It protects against another 
lawyer’s influence that might undermine a client’s confidence in his or 
her lawyer and lead a client: to disclose privileged or confidential 
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information, to refrain from pursuing certain claims, to agree to a 
settlement, or to take other action without the advice of counsel. This 
Rule’s protections are not unlimited, however, and must be balanced 
with the role of informal investigation and fact-finding in limiting costs, 
substantiating claims, and promoting legitimate law enforcement 
activities within the legal system. 
[2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is 
represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the 
communication relates. 
[3] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented 
person, or an employee or agent of such a person, concerning matters 
outside the scope of the representation. For example, the existence of a 
controversy between a government agency and a private party, or 
between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from 
communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding 
unrelated matters or matters outside of the scope of the representation. 
Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented person 
who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a 
client in the matter. 
[4] A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule 
through the acts of another. See Rule 8.4(a). Where authorized by law, 
however, government lawyers may advise law enforcement officials 
about communications with a represented person prior to the filing of a 
formal criminal charge or civil complaint against or the arrest of the 
person in the matter. Non-lawyer parties to a matter may communicate 
directly with each other, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising a 
client concerning a communication that the client is legally entitled to 
make. 
[5] This Rule applies to a lawyer who is a party to a proceeding in 
the same manner as it does to a lawyer representing a client. 
[6] In the case of a represented organization, consent of the 
organization’s lawyer is not required for communication with a former 
constituent unless the former constituent is represented by the 
organization’s lawyer through an independent engagement or unless a 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the former constituent’s 
conduct materially contributed to the matter underlying the 
representation. In communicating with a former constituent, a lawyer 
shall not seek to elicit privileged or confidential information. If a 
constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her 
own lawyer, consent by that lawyer to a communication will be sufficient 
for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). In communicating with a 
current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use 
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methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the 
organization. See Rule 4.4. 
[7] Once a proceeding has been certified as a class action and any 
opt-out period has expired, members of the class are considered 
represented persons for purposes of this Rule. Prior to that time, only 
those members of the class with whom the class’s lawyer maintains a 
personal client-lawyer relationship are considered represented persons. 
[8] Communications authorized by law include communications that 
a lawyer is authorized to make under Federal and state constitutional 
law, statute, agency regulation having the force of law, or decision or rule 
of a court of competent jurisdiction. Communications authorized by law 
may include investigative activities of lawyers representing governmental 
entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the 
commencement of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. When 
communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a government 
lawyer has other legal obligations, such as those protecting constitutional 
rights of an accused. 
[9] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a 
represented person is permissible may seek a court order. A lawyer may 
also seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a 
communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this Rule, for 
example, where the represented person’s lawyer is abusing this Rule, 
where a lawyer has been unable to contact the represented person’s 
lawyer, or where a public policy rationale strongly supports a waiver of 
this Rule. 
[10] Communications necessary in light of what the lawyer 
reasonably believes to be an emergency include communications that the 
lawyer believes necessary to address an imminent and reasonably certain 
risk of death, substantial bodily harm or compromised personal safety. 
They may also include communications that the lawyer believes 
necessary to address an imminent risk of harm to the financial interests 
or property of another, in furtherance of which the lawyer’s client used 
the lawyer’s services. See Rule 1.6. Where the risk of harm is not 
imminent, a lawyer should seek a court order prior to engaging in the 
communication. 
[11] Communications with a public officer or agency permitted 
under this Rule include those by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is 
exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the 
government under Federal or state law. This exception does not 
encompass communications regarding imminent or pending litigation, 
nor does it apply to a public official who is potentially personally liable in 
the matter in question. 
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[12] A represented person, including a constituent of a represented 
organization, may waive the protections of this Rule by initiating the 
communication with the lawyer. A lawyer involved in a matter who is 
contacted by a represented person in the matter shall confirm the 
represented person’s communication in writing. 
[13] The prohibition on communications with a represented person 
only applies in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is 
in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the 
lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such 
actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 
1.0(f). Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the 
consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious. In the context of 
organizational representation, the prohibition on communications 
applies where the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a 
constituent is in a position within the organization to be classified as a 
represented person. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of 
the constituent’s position or that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and 
competence would have actual knowledge in the same circumstances. 
See Rule 1.0(j). 
[14] When a lawyer communicates with a person not known to be 
represented by counsel or with a represented person under an exception 
to this Rule, the lawyer’s communications are subject to Rule 4.3. When 
engaging in undercover investigatory communications authorized by law, 
however, a lawyer is not required to identify the lawyer’s identity and 
role in the matter. 
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